Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government Agencies

The purpose of the study is to create a model of motivation for the top management of regional government agencies under which the non-material motivation of top managers will be made dependent on the achieved strategic potential of the region and their material motivation. For this purpose, it is n...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Egor Koshelev
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University 2023-12-01
Series:Sustainable Development and Engineering Economics
Subjects:
_version_ 1797302801776246784
author Egor Koshelev
author_facet Egor Koshelev
author_sort Egor Koshelev
collection DOAJ
description The purpose of the study is to create a model of motivation for the top management of regional government agencies under which the non-material motivation of top managers will be made dependent on the achieved strategic potential of the region and their material motivation. For this purpose, it is necessary to solve a three-objective problem of global optimisation for the coefficient of natural population growth using a multi-objective genetic algorithm. Each of the three objectives – the strategic potential of the region and the material and non-material motivations of top managers – depends on three factors in the same coordinate system. The first three of the nine factors characterise the system of non-material incentives for top managers in government agencies, the next three refer to the system of their material incentives, and the last three apply to the available strategic potential of the region necessary for its further successful development. The creation of multiple effective solutions using the Pareto front is performed for two primary objectives, namely, the strategic potential of the region and material motivation of top management; then, as a consequence, a set of optimal solutions for non-material motivation is obtained. The conclusion about the actual remuneration (incentives) of the top managers at government agencies in the regions is as follows. For each of the three objectives in a particular region, the latest actual values of the nine factors under study are compared with the nearest planned (optimum) values of the Pareto front. A positive deviation from the optimum is evaluated positively, which makes it possible to additionally incentivise top managers either materially or non-materially.
first_indexed 2024-03-07T23:44:12Z
format Article
id doaj.art-6283d90140094baf9e6d26953bb36445
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 2782-6333
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-07T23:44:12Z
publishDate 2023-12-01
publisher Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University
record_format Article
series Sustainable Development and Engineering Economics
spelling doaj.art-6283d90140094baf9e6d26953bb364452024-02-19T20:06:18ZengPeter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic UniversitySustainable Development and Engineering Economics2782-63332023-12-0146580https://doi.org/10.48554/SDEE.2023.4.5Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government AgenciesEgor Koshelev0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5290-7913Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod, RussiaThe purpose of the study is to create a model of motivation for the top management of regional government agencies under which the non-material motivation of top managers will be made dependent on the achieved strategic potential of the region and their material motivation. For this purpose, it is necessary to solve a three-objective problem of global optimisation for the coefficient of natural population growth using a multi-objective genetic algorithm. Each of the three objectives – the strategic potential of the region and the material and non-material motivations of top managers – depends on three factors in the same coordinate system. The first three of the nine factors characterise the system of non-material incentives for top managers in government agencies, the next three refer to the system of their material incentives, and the last three apply to the available strategic potential of the region necessary for its further successful development. The creation of multiple effective solutions using the Pareto front is performed for two primary objectives, namely, the strategic potential of the region and material motivation of top management; then, as a consequence, a set of optimal solutions for non-material motivation is obtained. The conclusion about the actual remuneration (incentives) of the top managers at government agencies in the regions is as follows. For each of the three objectives in a particular region, the latest actual values of the nine factors under study are compared with the nearest planned (optimum) values of the Pareto front. A positive deviation from the optimum is evaluated positively, which makes it possible to additionally incentivise top managers either materially or non-materially.material motivationnon-material motivationmulti-objective genetic algorithmpattern search
spellingShingle Egor Koshelev
Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government Agencies
Sustainable Development and Engineering Economics
material motivation
non-material motivation
multi-objective genetic algorithm
pattern search
title Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government Agencies
title_full Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government Agencies
title_fullStr Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government Agencies
title_full_unstemmed Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government Agencies
title_short Model of Motivation for the Top Management of Regional Government Agencies
title_sort model of motivation for the top management of regional government agencies
topic material motivation
non-material motivation
multi-objective genetic algorithm
pattern search
work_keys_str_mv AT egorkoshelev modelofmotivationforthetopmanagementofregionalgovernmentagencies