Punishment: one tool, many uses
Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment – paying a cost to harm others – is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. Howev...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Evolutionary Human Sciences |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2513843X19000124/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1811156432057270272 |
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| author | Nichola J. Raihani Redouan Bshary |
| author_facet | Nichola J. Raihani Redouan Bshary |
| author_sort | Nichola J. Raihani |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment – paying a cost to harm others – is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-10T04:50:26Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-62a3f86fbf9748788eef04c3762725bc |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2513-843X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-10T04:50:26Z |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Evolutionary Human Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-62a3f86fbf9748788eef04c3762725bc2023-03-09T12:32:07ZengCambridge University PressEvolutionary Human Sciences2513-843X2019-01-01110.1017/ehs.2019.12Punishment: one tool, many usesNichola J. Raihani0https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2339-9889Redouan Bshary1https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7198-8472Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UKInstitut de Biologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Rue Emilie-Argand 11, Neuchâtel, CH-2000, SwitzerlandHumans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment – paying a cost to harm others – is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2513843X19000124/type/journal_articleCompetitioncooperationfairnesspunishmentspite |
| spellingShingle | Nichola J. Raihani Redouan Bshary Punishment: one tool, many uses Evolutionary Human Sciences Competition cooperation fairness punishment spite |
| title | Punishment: one tool, many uses |
| title_full | Punishment: one tool, many uses |
| title_fullStr | Punishment: one tool, many uses |
| title_full_unstemmed | Punishment: one tool, many uses |
| title_short | Punishment: one tool, many uses |
| title_sort | punishment one tool many uses |
| topic | Competition cooperation fairness punishment spite |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2513843X19000124/type/journal_article |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nicholajraihani punishmentonetoolmanyuses AT redouanbshary punishmentonetoolmanyuses |