Quantile Stable Mechanisms
We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are...
Main Authors: | Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia, M. Bumin Yenmez |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2021-05-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/43 |
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