Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage
The growing tendency for suppliers to encroach on the retailers’ market has forced the retailers, being independent entities, to distort shared information to maintain their information superiority. Previous studies on asymmetric information assumed that retailers share information truthfu...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2019-03-01
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| Series: | Symmetry |
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| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/11/3/308 |
| _version_ | 1818008133861113856 |
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| author | Debin Fang Qiyu Ren |
| author_facet | Debin Fang Qiyu Ren |
| author_sort | Debin Fang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The growing tendency for suppliers to encroach on the retailers’ market has forced the retailers, being independent entities, to distort shared information to maintain their information superiority. Previous studies on asymmetric information assumed that retailers share information truthfully or that demand satisfies a two-point distribution, which does not always conform to the reality of the dual-channel supply chain. Considering the potential information leakage problem, this paper studied the optimal strategies of the participants and focused on the strategic information management of the dual-channel supply chain. By introducing the retailers’ adverse selection behavior, a sequential game model under general uncertain demand was established, which replaced the classic high-low demand model. The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium was characterized, which depended on stochastic demand disturbance, product heterogeneity, supply chain structure, and market investigation cost. The results showed that asymmetric information made the supply chain management inefficient. When the demand disturbance was within the threshold, the retailer distorted order quantity to maintain the information advantage under potential information leakage, and information acquisition was not always good for the retailer—in some cases due to adverse selection problems. A numerical example and a sensitivity analysis were done to validate the model. Our work provides participants in the dual-channel supply chain with decision-making support and direction for improving information management. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-14T05:25:17Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-636d2f5200f64322883d28996f0b0353 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-8994 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-14T05:25:17Z |
| publishDate | 2019-03-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Symmetry |
| spelling | doaj.art-636d2f5200f64322883d28996f0b03532022-12-22T02:09:59ZengMDPI AGSymmetry2073-89942019-03-0111330810.3390/sym11030308sym11030308Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information LeakageDebin Fang0Qiyu Ren1Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, ChinaEconomics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, ChinaThe growing tendency for suppliers to encroach on the retailers’ market has forced the retailers, being independent entities, to distort shared information to maintain their information superiority. Previous studies on asymmetric information assumed that retailers share information truthfully or that demand satisfies a two-point distribution, which does not always conform to the reality of the dual-channel supply chain. Considering the potential information leakage problem, this paper studied the optimal strategies of the participants and focused on the strategic information management of the dual-channel supply chain. By introducing the retailers’ adverse selection behavior, a sequential game model under general uncertain demand was established, which replaced the classic high-low demand model. The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium was characterized, which depended on stochastic demand disturbance, product heterogeneity, supply chain structure, and market investigation cost. The results showed that asymmetric information made the supply chain management inefficient. When the demand disturbance was within the threshold, the retailer distorted order quantity to maintain the information advantage under potential information leakage, and information acquisition was not always good for the retailer—in some cases due to adverse selection problems. A numerical example and a sensitivity analysis were done to validate the model. Our work provides participants in the dual-channel supply chain with decision-making support and direction for improving information management.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/11/3/308supply chain managementasymmetric informationinformation leakagedual-channel supply chaindecision support systems |
| spellingShingle | Debin Fang Qiyu Ren Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage Symmetry supply chain management asymmetric information information leakage dual-channel supply chain decision support systems |
| title | Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage |
| title_full | Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage |
| title_short | Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage |
| title_sort | optimal decision in a dual channel supply chain under potential information leakage |
| topic | supply chain management asymmetric information information leakage dual-channel supply chain decision support systems |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/11/3/308 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT debinfang optimaldecisioninadualchannelsupplychainunderpotentialinformationleakage AT qiyuren optimaldecisioninadualchannelsupplychainunderpotentialinformationleakage |