Ambifictional Counterfactuals
In this paper, I argue that David Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactual discourse and for fictional discourse are apparently inconsistent and in need of revision. The problem emerges for Lewis’s account once one considers how to evaluate <i>ambifictional counterfactuals</i>...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Philosophies |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/6/108 |
| _version_ | 1827267664972611584 |
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| author | Andrew D. Bassford |
| author_facet | Andrew D. Bassford |
| author_sort | Andrew D. Bassford |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper, I argue that David Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactual discourse and for fictional discourse are apparently inconsistent and in need of revision. The problem emerges for Lewis’s account once one considers how to evaluate <i>ambifictional counterfactuals</i>. Since this is likely not a concept familiar to most, and since it does not appear that the problem has been previously recognized in the critical literature, I will begin by rehearsing Lewis’s possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals and fiction. Then I will explicate the distinction between intrafictional, extrafictional, interfictional, and ambifictional propositions. Next, I will state what an ambifictional counterfactual proposition is, and explain why this kind of discourse confounds Lewis’s system. I will conclude, finally, with a brief discussion of how the Lewisian would be best advised to resolve the paradox. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T20:26:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-639c8447fb0c449cb00e91ab1deb0801 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2409-9287 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-03-22T04:37:21Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Philosophies |
| spelling | doaj.art-639c8447fb0c449cb00e91ab1deb08012024-04-28T00:28:20ZengMDPI AGPhilosophies2409-92872023-11-018610810.3390/philosophies8060108Ambifictional CounterfactualsAndrew D. Bassford0Philosophy Department, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78713, USAIn this paper, I argue that David Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactual discourse and for fictional discourse are apparently inconsistent and in need of revision. The problem emerges for Lewis’s account once one considers how to evaluate <i>ambifictional counterfactuals</i>. Since this is likely not a concept familiar to most, and since it does not appear that the problem has been previously recognized in the critical literature, I will begin by rehearsing Lewis’s possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals and fiction. Then I will explicate the distinction between intrafictional, extrafictional, interfictional, and ambifictional propositions. Next, I will state what an ambifictional counterfactual proposition is, and explain why this kind of discourse confounds Lewis’s system. I will conclude, finally, with a brief discussion of how the Lewisian would be best advised to resolve the paradox.https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/6/108possible world semanticspossible world theories of counterfactualstruth in fictionfictional charactersDavid Lewis |
| spellingShingle | Andrew D. Bassford Ambifictional Counterfactuals Philosophies possible world semantics possible world theories of counterfactuals truth in fiction fictional characters David Lewis |
| title | Ambifictional Counterfactuals |
| title_full | Ambifictional Counterfactuals |
| title_fullStr | Ambifictional Counterfactuals |
| title_full_unstemmed | Ambifictional Counterfactuals |
| title_short | Ambifictional Counterfactuals |
| title_sort | ambifictional counterfactuals |
| topic | possible world semantics possible world theories of counterfactuals truth in fiction fictional characters David Lewis |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/8/6/108 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT andrewdbassford ambifictionalcounterfactuals |