Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism
This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreement with Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and point out that this...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra
2015-09-01
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| Series: | Law, Ethics and Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://raco.cat/index.php/LEAP/article/view/297560 |
| _version_ | 1828220649681715200 |
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| author | Larry Temkin |
| author_facet | Larry Temkin |
| author_sort | Larry Temkin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the Internal
Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and
Inconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreement
with Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and point
out that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on an
Internal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-
Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that people
might find plausible, and that in some circumstances, at least, these might
have deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular,
I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, his
Time-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-Dependent
Person-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought to
do, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better.
But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’t
apply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that the
two Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Arguments
are contradictory. I question Horta’s (seeming) position that there is
no point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on the
basis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solve
the predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude my
paper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views about
nontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatible
with the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T16:30:04Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-64c1e6f1b471409a960bd47525cbe153 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2341-1465 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T16:30:04Z |
| publishDate | 2015-09-01 |
| publisher | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Law, Ethics and Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-64c1e6f1b471409a960bd47525cbe1532022-12-22T03:25:11ZengUniversitat Pompeu FabraLaw, Ethics and Philosophy2341-14652015-09-012Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral RealismLarry TemkinThis article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreement with Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and point out that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on an Internal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person- Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that people might find plausible, and that in some circumstances, at least, these might have deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular, I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, his Time-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought to do, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better. But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’t apply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that the two Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Arguments are contradictory. I question Horta’s (seeming) position that there is no point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on the basis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solve the predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude my paper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views about nontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatible with the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor.https://raco.cat/index.php/LEAP/article/view/297560TransitivitySpectrum ArgumentsPerson-Affecting PrinciplesInternal Aspects ViewBetter thanEssentially Comparative View |
| spellingShingle | Larry Temkin Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism Law, Ethics and Philosophy Transitivity Spectrum Arguments Person-Affecting Principles Internal Aspects View Better than Essentially Comparative View |
| title | Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism |
| title_full | Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism |
| title_fullStr | Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism |
| title_short | Reply to Horta: Spectrum Arguments, the “Unhelpfulness” of Rejecting Transitivity, and Implications for Moral Realism |
| title_sort | reply to horta spectrum arguments the unhelpfulness of rejecting transitivity and implications for moral realism |
| topic | Transitivity Spectrum Arguments Person-Affecting Principles Internal Aspects View Better than Essentially Comparative View |
| url | https://raco.cat/index.php/LEAP/article/view/297560 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT larrytemkin replytohortaspectrumargumentstheunhelpfulnessofrejectingtransitivityandimplicationsformoralrealism |