Proper, transparent and just prioritization policy as a challenge for national competition authorities and prioritization of the Slovak NCA
The paper tries to establish some limits of the framework for prioritization policy in order to show that the NCAs are still bound by certain principles for setting their prioritization policies and are not completely independent or autonomous. In this context, priority setting by the Slovak NCA,...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Warsaw
2020-11-01
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| Series: | Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies |
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| Online Access: | https://yars.wz.uw.edu.pl/images/yars2020_13_22/YARS_13_22_7_Blazo.pdf |
| Summary: | The paper tries to establish some limits of the framework for prioritization policy
in order to show that the NCAs are still bound by certain principles for setting
their prioritization policies and are not completely independent or autonomous.
In this context, priority setting by the Slovak NCA, surveillance of this process and
evaluation of its credibility is analysed. The power to prioritize cases became a part
of the ‘independence toolkit’ of the ECN+ Directive and is linked to effective
use of limited resources. Despite including prioritization into the elements of
independence of NCAs, the ECN+ Directive gives no further requirements for
the prioritisation of the performance of enforcement powers of NCAs. Decisions
regarding prioritization of enforcement can allow a NCA to focus on the most
serious infringements of competition law. On the other hand, they can be challenged
due to lack of transparency, arbitrariness, disproportionality and because of
unequal treatment. Hence the prioritization policy, as well as individual decisions,
shall be embedded into the framework safeguarding proper enforcement and due
process of law. The legal framework of the European Commission for the system
of rejection of cases as well as limited judicial review can serve as an inspiration for
NCAs. Although NCAs are not restricted in the selection of their priorities, some
competition infringements shall be inevitably included in their priorities, such as
cartels and bid rigging. The case of Slovakia and its NCA shows a relatively low
level of accountability of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO)
to the parliament, and judicial as well as parliamentary control of the prioritization
and case selection of the AMO is limited.The paper concludes that within the
reform of the Slovak NCA, it will be insufficient to only grant the AMO guarantees
of independence, including independence of priority setting, and that mechanisms
of accountability and review shall be evolved. |
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| ISSN: | 1689-9024 2545-0115 |