The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilem...

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Main Author: Ryo Tanaka
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 2024-01-01
Series:European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/455769
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author Ryo Tanaka
author_facet Ryo Tanaka
author_sort Ryo Tanaka
collection DOAJ
description In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results.
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spelling doaj.art-6530789b316b4b6894acf46e5787b4182024-04-15T19:29:07ZengUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy1845-84751849-05142024-01-01201558510.31820/ejap.20.1.3The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case StudyRyo Tanaka0University of Tokyo, JapanIn this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results.https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/455769expressivismmoral dilemmasmetaethicssemanticsdeontic logic
spellingShingle Ryo Tanaka
The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
expressivism
moral dilemmas
metaethics
semantics
deontic logic
title The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study
title_full The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study
title_fullStr The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study
title_full_unstemmed The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study
title_short The Logical Possibility of Moral Dilemmas in Expressivist Semantics: A Case Study
title_sort logical possibility of moral dilemmas in expressivist semantics a case study
topic expressivism
moral dilemmas
metaethics
semantics
deontic logic
url https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/455769
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