More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of Persons
Michael Esfeld has recently put forth his ontology of persons, with which he hopes to secure freedom and irreducible personhood as well as scientific realism, all by working with minimal ontological assumptions. I present his view and investigate it, finding it too minimalistic: Esfeld’s featureless...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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University of Warsaw
2023-11-01
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Series: | Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture |
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Online Access: | https://eidos.uw.edu.pl/more-substance-please/ |
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author | Alin Christoph Cucu |
author_facet | Alin Christoph Cucu |
author_sort | Alin Christoph Cucu |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Michael Esfeld has recently put forth his ontology of persons, with which he hopes to secure freedom and irreducible personhood as well as scientific realism, all by working with minimal ontological assumptions. I present his view and investigate it, finding it too minimalistic: Esfeld’s featureless matter points do not warrant an emergence of persons from matter, and his claim that persons can create themselves by adopting a normative attitude seems more like a just-so story. Also, Esfeld’s rejection of classical mind-body dualism seems premature. I present as an alternative a modified mind-body dualism which solves the problems of Esfeld’s view and argue that embedding it in a theistic worldview is favorable for any account that seeks to establish irreducible personhood. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:50:37Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-6542bc30c3114b41a74df2fdfb0b31a3 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2544-302X |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:50:37Z |
publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
publisher | University of Warsaw |
record_format | Article |
series | Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture |
spelling | doaj.art-6542bc30c3114b41a74df2fdfb0b31a32023-12-16T16:48:44ZengUniversity of WarsawEidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture2544-302X2023-11-0173486610.14394/eidos.jpc.2023.0023More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of PersonsAlin Christoph Cucu0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9127-9662University of LausanneMichael Esfeld has recently put forth his ontology of persons, with which he hopes to secure freedom and irreducible personhood as well as scientific realism, all by working with minimal ontological assumptions. I present his view and investigate it, finding it too minimalistic: Esfeld’s featureless matter points do not warrant an emergence of persons from matter, and his claim that persons can create themselves by adopting a normative attitude seems more like a just-so story. Also, Esfeld’s rejection of classical mind-body dualism seems premature. I present as an alternative a modified mind-body dualism which solves the problems of Esfeld’s view and argue that embedding it in a theistic worldview is favorable for any account that seeks to establish irreducible personhood.https://eidos.uw.edu.pl/more-substance-please/personsnaturalismsuper-humeanismcausal closuredualismminimalist ontology |
spellingShingle | Alin Christoph Cucu More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of Persons Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture persons naturalism super-humeanism causal closure dualism minimalist ontology |
title | More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of Persons |
title_full | More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of Persons |
title_fullStr | More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of Persons |
title_full_unstemmed | More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of Persons |
title_short | More Substance, Please: A Reply To Michael Esfeld’s Minimalist Ontology of Persons |
title_sort | more substance please a reply to michael esfeld s minimalist ontology of persons |
topic | persons naturalism super-humeanism causal closure dualism minimalist ontology |
url | https://eidos.uw.edu.pl/more-substance-please/ |
work_keys_str_mv | AT alinchristophcucu moresubstancepleaseareplytomichaelesfeldsminimalistontologyofpersons |