Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.

Punishment offers a powerful mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies, but the maintenance of costly punishment itself remains problematic. Game theory has shown that corruption, where punishers can defect without being punished themselves, may sustain cooperation....

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Main Authors: Edgar A Duéñez-Guzmán, Suzanne Sadedin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2012-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3440392?pdf=render
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author Edgar A Duéñez-Guzmán
Suzanne Sadedin
author_facet Edgar A Duéñez-Guzmán
Suzanne Sadedin
author_sort Edgar A Duéñez-Guzmán
collection DOAJ
description Punishment offers a powerful mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies, but the maintenance of costly punishment itself remains problematic. Game theory has shown that corruption, where punishers can defect without being punished themselves, may sustain cooperation. However, in many human societies and some insect ones, high levels of cooperation coexist with low levels of corruption, and such societies show greater wellbeing than societies with high corruption. Here we show that small payments from cooperators to punishers can destabilize corrupt societies and lead to the spread of punishment without corruption (righteousness). Righteousness can prevail even in the face of persistent power inequalities. The resultant righteous societies are highly stable and have higher wellbeing than corrupt ones. This result may help to explain the persistence of costly punishing behavior, and indicates that corruption is a sub-optimal tool for maintaining cooperation in human societies.
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spelling doaj.art-658b8a01cebf428897176ab84e3c6a7e2022-12-21T23:58:41ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032012-01-0179e4443210.1371/journal.pone.0044432Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.Edgar A Duéñez-GuzmánSuzanne SadedinPunishment offers a powerful mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies, but the maintenance of costly punishment itself remains problematic. Game theory has shown that corruption, where punishers can defect without being punished themselves, may sustain cooperation. However, in many human societies and some insect ones, high levels of cooperation coexist with low levels of corruption, and such societies show greater wellbeing than societies with high corruption. Here we show that small payments from cooperators to punishers can destabilize corrupt societies and lead to the spread of punishment without corruption (righteousness). Righteousness can prevail even in the face of persistent power inequalities. The resultant righteous societies are highly stable and have higher wellbeing than corrupt ones. This result may help to explain the persistence of costly punishing behavior, and indicates that corruption is a sub-optimal tool for maintaining cooperation in human societies.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3440392?pdf=render
spellingShingle Edgar A Duéñez-Guzmán
Suzanne Sadedin
Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.
PLoS ONE
title Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.
title_full Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.
title_fullStr Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.
title_full_unstemmed Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.
title_short Evolving righteousness in a corrupt world.
title_sort evolving righteousness in a corrupt world
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3440392?pdf=render
work_keys_str_mv AT edgaraduenezguzman evolvingrighteousnessinacorruptworld
AT suzannesadedin evolvingrighteousnessinacorruptworld