A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral Reasons
Moral particularism, which is one of the intellectual orientations in contemporary ethics, opposes the importance of principles in morality and in principled theories of ethics on metaethical grounds, and regards it detrimental to moral thought and judgement. I believe that the particularist’s chall...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages
2022-10-01
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| Series: | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
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| Online Access: | https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_15696_6ee247d49ad89e6cbdd46fbbfcfd5b7f.pdf |
| _version_ | 1827832947628048384 |
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| author | Seyyed Ali Asghari |
| author_facet | Seyyed Ali Asghari |
| author_sort | Seyyed Ali Asghari |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Moral particularism, which is one of the intellectual orientations in contemporary ethics, opposes the importance of principles in morality and in principled theories of ethics on metaethical grounds, and regards it detrimental to moral thought and judgement. I believe that the particularist’s challenge against principled ethics is important, and therefore it is a requirement that the problems of particularism are identified to be then solved. In this paper, I investigate some problems of particularism that stem from particularists’ reliance on reasons. I first explain what reason is in moral metaphysics debates, and after discussing the relations between holism, atomism, particularism, and generalism, I make clear why particularism’s reliance on reasons is not useful for it. Reliance on reasons is also detrimental to particularism, in the sense that causes inadequacies in it. For, first, conceiving morality only in terms of reasons at best creates an inadequate conception of moral obligation and therefore of morality; and second, narrowly conceiving moral principles in terms of general reasons prevents particularism from being inclusive against all principled theories of ethics. I discuss why the categorical imperative as a significant example shows that the scope of moral principles is broader than the scope of moral reasons. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T05:22:41Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-659b28054ee843b4a6fa8a8e3947f4b9 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2251-7960 2423-4419 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T05:22:41Z |
| publishDate | 2022-10-01 |
| publisher | University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
| spelling | doaj.art-659b28054ee843b4a6fa8a8e3947f4b92023-09-03T07:35:31ZengUniversity of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen LanguagesJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-79602423-44192022-10-01164042944410.22034/jpiut.2022.52603.330515696A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral ReasonsSeyyed Ali Asghari0Assistant Professor, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, IranMoral particularism, which is one of the intellectual orientations in contemporary ethics, opposes the importance of principles in morality and in principled theories of ethics on metaethical grounds, and regards it detrimental to moral thought and judgement. I believe that the particularist’s challenge against principled ethics is important, and therefore it is a requirement that the problems of particularism are identified to be then solved. In this paper, I investigate some problems of particularism that stem from particularists’ reliance on reasons. I first explain what reason is in moral metaphysics debates, and after discussing the relations between holism, atomism, particularism, and generalism, I make clear why particularism’s reliance on reasons is not useful for it. Reliance on reasons is also detrimental to particularism, in the sense that causes inadequacies in it. For, first, conceiving morality only in terms of reasons at best creates an inadequate conception of moral obligation and therefore of morality; and second, narrowly conceiving moral principles in terms of general reasons prevents particularism from being inclusive against all principled theories of ethics. I discuss why the categorical imperative as a significant example shows that the scope of moral principles is broader than the scope of moral reasons.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_15696_6ee247d49ad89e6cbdd46fbbfcfd5b7f.pdfmoral principlesholismatomismgeneralismmoral obligation |
| spellingShingle | Seyyed Ali Asghari A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral Reasons Journal of Philosophical Investigations moral principles holism atomism generalism moral obligation |
| title | A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral Reasons |
| title_full | A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral Reasons |
| title_fullStr | A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral Reasons |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral Reasons |
| title_short | A Critique of Moral Particularism’s Reliance on Moral Reasons |
| title_sort | critique of moral particularism s reliance on moral reasons |
| topic | moral principles holism atomism generalism moral obligation |
| url | https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_15696_6ee247d49ad89e6cbdd46fbbfcfd5b7f.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT seyyedaliasghari acritiqueofmoralparticularismsrelianceonmoralreasons AT seyyedaliasghari critiqueofmoralparticularismsrelianceonmoralreasons |