Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is
In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Windsor
2014-02-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3899 |
| _version_ | 1818741451532533760 |
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| author | G.C. Goddu |
| author_facet | G.C. Goddu |
| author_sort | G.C. Goddu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-18T01:56:50Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-65adc9198960463688d68dc36c732750 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0824-2577 2293-734X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-18T01:56:50Z |
| publishDate | 2014-02-01 |
| publisher | University of Windsor |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Informal Logic |
| spelling | doaj.art-65adc9198960463688d68dc36c7327502022-12-21T21:24:54ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2014-02-01341Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument IsG.C. Goddu0University of RichmondIn his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments.https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3899argument“real”prospective useHambytheoretical relevance |
| spellingShingle | G.C. Goddu Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is Informal Logic argument “real” prospective use Hamby theoretical relevance |
| title | Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is |
| title_full | Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is |
| title_fullStr | Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is |
| title_short | Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is |
| title_sort | why we still do not know what a real argument is |
| topic | argument “real” prospective use Hamby theoretical relevance |
| url | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3899 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gcgoddu whywestilldonotknowwhatarealargumentis |