Truth-Telling in a Sender–Receiver Game: Social Value Orientation and Incentives
Previous research has discussed the effects of monetary incentives and prosociality on deceptive behavior. However, research has not comprehensively investigated the relationship between these two factors. In the current research, we introduce a repeated two-player sender–receiver binary choice task...
Main Authors: | Hanshu Zhang, Frederic Moisan, Palvi Aggarwal, Cleotilde Gonzalez |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2022-07-01
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Series: | Symmetry |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/14/8/1561 |
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