High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve Implementations
Elliptic-curve implementations protected with state-of-the-art countermeasures against side-channel attacks might still be vulnerable to advanced attacks that recover secret information from a single leakage trace. The effectiveness of these attacks is boosted by the emergence of deep learning tech...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2022-11-01
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| Series: | Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9952 |
| _version_ | 1811190395365752832 |
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| author | Sonia Belaïd Matthieu Rivain |
| author_facet | Sonia Belaïd Matthieu Rivain |
| author_sort | Sonia Belaïd |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
Elliptic-curve implementations protected with state-of-the-art countermeasures against side-channel attacks might still be vulnerable to advanced attacks that recover secret information from a single leakage trace. The effectiveness of these attacks is boosted by the emergence of deep learning techniques for side-channel analysis which relax the control or knowledge an adversary must have on the target implementation. In this paper, we provide generic countermeasures to withstand these attacks for a wide range of regular elliptic-curve implementations. We first introduce a framework to formally model a regular algebraic program which consists of a sequence of algebraic operations indexed by key-dependent values. We then introduce a generic countermeasure to protect these types of programs against advanced single-trace side-channel attacks. Our scheme achieves provable security in the noisy leakage model under a formal assumption on the leakage of randomized variables. To demonstrate the applicability of our solution, we provide concrete examples on several widely deployed scalar multiplication algorithms and report some benchmarks for a protected implementation on a smart card.
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| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T14:50:40Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-67d78b0672864701bc329d94d02aeff1 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2569-2925 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T14:50:40Z |
| publishDate | 2022-11-01 |
| publisher | Ruhr-Universität Bochum |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems |
| spelling | doaj.art-67d78b0672864701bc329d94d02aeff12022-12-22T04:17:30ZengRuhr-Universität BochumTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems2569-29252022-11-012023110.46586/tches.v2023.i1.238-276High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve ImplementationsSonia Belaïd0Matthieu Rivain1CryptoExperts, Paris, FranceCryptoExperts, Paris, France Elliptic-curve implementations protected with state-of-the-art countermeasures against side-channel attacks might still be vulnerable to advanced attacks that recover secret information from a single leakage trace. The effectiveness of these attacks is boosted by the emergence of deep learning techniques for side-channel analysis which relax the control or knowledge an adversary must have on the target implementation. In this paper, we provide generic countermeasures to withstand these attacks for a wide range of regular elliptic-curve implementations. We first introduce a framework to formally model a regular algebraic program which consists of a sequence of algebraic operations indexed by key-dependent values. We then introduce a generic countermeasure to protect these types of programs against advanced single-trace side-channel attacks. Our scheme achieves provable security in the noisy leakage model under a formal assumption on the leakage of randomized variables. To demonstrate the applicability of our solution, we provide concrete examples on several widely deployed scalar multiplication algorithms and report some benchmarks for a protected implementation on a smart card. https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9952Side-channel countermeasureselliptic-curve cryptographymaskingnoisy leakage modelcollision attacksdeep learning-based SCA |
| spellingShingle | Sonia Belaïd Matthieu Rivain High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve Implementations Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Side-channel countermeasures elliptic-curve cryptography masking noisy leakage model collision attacks deep learning-based SCA |
| title | High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve Implementations |
| title_full | High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve Implementations |
| title_fullStr | High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve Implementations |
| title_full_unstemmed | High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve Implementations |
| title_short | High Order Side-Channel Security for Elliptic-Curve Implementations |
| title_sort | high order side channel security for elliptic curve implementations |
| topic | Side-channel countermeasures elliptic-curve cryptography masking noisy leakage model collision attacks deep learning-based SCA |
| url | https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9952 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT soniabelaid highordersidechannelsecurityforellipticcurveimplementations AT matthieurivain highordersidechannelsecurityforellipticcurveimplementations |