Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection Technique

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have demonstrated significant superiority in modern artificial intelligence (AI) applications. To accelerate the inference process of CNNs, reconfigurable CNN accelerators that support diverse networks are widely employed for AI systems. Given the ubiquitous depl...

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Main Authors: Jia Hou, Zichu Liu, Zepeng Yang, Chen Yang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2024-01-01
Series:Micromachines
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2072-666X/15/1/149
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author Jia Hou
Zichu Liu
Zepeng Yang
Chen Yang
author_facet Jia Hou
Zichu Liu
Zepeng Yang
Chen Yang
author_sort Jia Hou
collection DOAJ
description Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have demonstrated significant superiority in modern artificial intelligence (AI) applications. To accelerate the inference process of CNNs, reconfigurable CNN accelerators that support diverse networks are widely employed for AI systems. Given the ubiquitous deployment of these AI systems, there is a growing concern regarding the security of CNN accelerators and the potential attacks they may face, including hardware Trojans. This paper proposes a hardware Trojan designed to attack a crucial component of FPGA-based CNN accelerators: the reconfigurable interconnection network. Specifically, the hardware Trojan alters the data paths during activation, resulting in incorrect connections in the arithmetic circuit and consequently causing erroneous convolutional computations. To address this issue, the paper introduces a novel detection technique based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs) to safeguard the reconfigurable interconnection network against hardware Trojan attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that by incorporating a mere 0.27% hardware overhead to the accelerator, the proposed hardware Trojan can degrade the inference accuracy of popular neural network architectures, including LeNet, AlexNet, and VGG, by a significant range of 8.93% to 86.20%. The implemented arbiter-PUF circuit on a Xilinx Zynq XC7Z100 platform successfully detects the presence and location of hardware Trojans in a reconfigurable interconnection network. This research highlights the vulnerability of reconfigurable CNN accelerators to hardware Trojan attacks and proposes a promising detection technique to mitigate potential security risks. The findings underscore the importance of addressing hardware security concerns in the design and deployment of AI systems utilizing FPGA-based CNN accelerators.
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spelling doaj.art-67f229b415984ad7a86f2439d5bb00312024-01-26T17:45:32ZengMDPI AGMicromachines2072-666X2024-01-0115114910.3390/mi15010149Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection TechniqueJia Hou0Zichu Liu1Zepeng Yang2Chen Yang3School of Microelectronics, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, ChinaSchool of Microelectronics, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, ChinaSchool of Microelectronics, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, ChinaSchool of Microelectronics, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, ChinaConvolutional neural networks (CNNs) have demonstrated significant superiority in modern artificial intelligence (AI) applications. To accelerate the inference process of CNNs, reconfigurable CNN accelerators that support diverse networks are widely employed for AI systems. Given the ubiquitous deployment of these AI systems, there is a growing concern regarding the security of CNN accelerators and the potential attacks they may face, including hardware Trojans. This paper proposes a hardware Trojan designed to attack a crucial component of FPGA-based CNN accelerators: the reconfigurable interconnection network. Specifically, the hardware Trojan alters the data paths during activation, resulting in incorrect connections in the arithmetic circuit and consequently causing erroneous convolutional computations. To address this issue, the paper introduces a novel detection technique based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs) to safeguard the reconfigurable interconnection network against hardware Trojan attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that by incorporating a mere 0.27% hardware overhead to the accelerator, the proposed hardware Trojan can degrade the inference accuracy of popular neural network architectures, including LeNet, AlexNet, and VGG, by a significant range of 8.93% to 86.20%. The implemented arbiter-PUF circuit on a Xilinx Zynq XC7Z100 platform successfully detects the presence and location of hardware Trojans in a reconfigurable interconnection network. This research highlights the vulnerability of reconfigurable CNN accelerators to hardware Trojan attacks and proposes a promising detection technique to mitigate potential security risks. The findings underscore the importance of addressing hardware security concerns in the design and deployment of AI systems utilizing FPGA-based CNN accelerators.https://www.mdpi.com/2072-666X/15/1/149convolutional neural networkreconfigurable CNN acceleratorhardware Trojanphysical unclonable functionfield-programmable gate array (FPGA)
spellingShingle Jia Hou
Zichu Liu
Zepeng Yang
Chen Yang
Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection Technique
Micromachines
convolutional neural network
reconfigurable CNN accelerator
hardware Trojan
physical unclonable function
field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
title Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection Technique
title_full Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection Technique
title_fullStr Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection Technique
title_full_unstemmed Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection Technique
title_short Hardware Trojan Attacks on the Reconfigurable Interconnections of Field-Programmable Gate Array-Based Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators and a Physically Unclonable Function-Based Countermeasure Detection Technique
title_sort hardware trojan attacks on the reconfigurable interconnections of field programmable gate array based convolutional neural network accelerators and a physically unclonable function based countermeasure detection technique
topic convolutional neural network
reconfigurable CNN accelerator
hardware Trojan
physical unclonable function
field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
url https://www.mdpi.com/2072-666X/15/1/149
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