The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining
We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce their...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-04-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/3/35 |
| _version_ | 1827737276675784704 |
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| author | Francesca Flamini |
| author_facet | Francesca Flamini |
| author_sort | Francesca Flamini |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce their rival to accept the short-run costs of policy changes designed to generate benefits in the long-run. This is more common when players’ asymmetries are less pronounced, the status-quo is fully endogenized and the state depreciates more quickly. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T02:26:23Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6836ae7a6d964b85affa966f9c081962 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T02:26:23Z |
| publishDate | 2023-04-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-6836ae7a6d964b85affa966f9c0819622023-11-18T10:31:22ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362023-04-011433510.3390/g14030035The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic BargainingFrancesca Flamini0Economics, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UKWe analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce their rival to accept the short-run costs of policy changes designed to generate benefits in the long-run. This is more common when players’ asymmetries are less pronounced, the status-quo is fully endogenized and the state depreciates more quickly.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/3/35bargaininginvestmentstatus-quo |
| spellingShingle | Francesca Flamini The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining Games bargaining investment status-quo |
| title | The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining |
| title_full | The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining |
| title_fullStr | The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining |
| title_short | The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining |
| title_sort | role of the status quo in dynamic bargaining |
| topic | bargaining investment status-quo |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/3/35 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT francescaflamini theroleofthestatusquoindynamicbargaining AT francescaflamini roleofthestatusquoindynamicbargaining |