RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC EXIGENCY IN “POSTDEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM”: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF THE EURO CRISIS
The author analyzes EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis, focusing on the problem of legislative and institutional fragmentation. She argues that the authoritarian crisis management – fueled by “crisis” discourse - subverted democratic accountability by its reliance on executive discretio...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law
2017-01-01
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| Series: | Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci |
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| Online Access: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/271784 |
| Summary: | The author analyzes EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis, focusing
on the problem of legislative and institutional fragmentation. She argues
that the authoritarian crisis management – fueled by “crisis” discourse -
subverted democratic accountability by its reliance on executive discretion and
intergovernmentalism. Through an analysis of European Court of Justice’s case
law as well as a close look at the exact workings and implications of European
Central Bank’s ultra vires actions, she shows how Lisbon Treaty was sacrificed
to the exigency of creating an Ersatz Union law more pliable to the immediate
concerns of reforming the EMU. She holds that the intergovernmental instruments
not only “unconstitutionally” requisitioned the involvement of EU institutions,
but also established a political administration unresponsive to democratic
accountability, damaging the legitimacy of the Union. The resulting subjugation
of the political and social constitution to economic conditions threatens an
abdication of law and undermines the integrity of the Union legal order. |
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| ISSN: | 1330-349X 1846-8314 |