Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games

In this paper, we examine a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy for a stochastic linear quadratic (LQ) differential game, in which admissible strategies are assumed to be constant on the interval between consecutive measurements. Our solution first involves transforming the problem into a linear...

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Hauptverfasser: Vasile Drăgan, Ivan Ganchev Ivanov, Ioan-Lucian Popa, Ovidiu Bagdasar
Format: Artikel
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: MDPI AG 2021-10-01
Schriftenreihe:Mathematics
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Online Zugang:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/21/2713
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author Vasile Drăgan
Ivan Ganchev Ivanov
Ioan-Lucian Popa
Ovidiu Bagdasar
author_facet Vasile Drăgan
Ivan Ganchev Ivanov
Ioan-Lucian Popa
Ovidiu Bagdasar
author_sort Vasile Drăgan
collection DOAJ
description In this paper, we examine a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy for a stochastic linear quadratic (LQ) differential game, in which admissible strategies are assumed to be constant on the interval between consecutive measurements. Our solution first involves transforming the problem into a linear stochastic system with finite jumps. This allows us to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions assuring the existence of a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy, extending earlier results to a general context with more than two players. Furthermore, we provide a numerical algorithm for calculating the feedback matrices of the Nash equilibrium strategies. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm by two numerical examples. As both situations highlight a stabilization effect, this confirms the efficiency of our approach.
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spelling doaj.art-689f5191224a4904b41f4b332aba0a1c2023-11-22T21:17:46ZengMDPI AGMathematics2227-73902021-10-01921271310.3390/math9212713Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ GamesVasile Drăgan0Ivan Ganchev Ivanov1Ioan-Lucian Popa2Ovidiu Bagdasar3“Simion Stoilow” Institute of Mathematics, Romanian Academy, P.O. Box 1-764, 014700 Bucharest, RomaniaFaculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, 1113 Sofia, BulgariaDepartment of Computing, Mathematics and Electronics, “1 Decembrie 1918” University of Alba Iulia, 510009 Alba Iulia, RomaniaSchool of Computing and Engineering, University of Derby, Derby DE22 1GB, UKIn this paper, we examine a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy for a stochastic linear quadratic (LQ) differential game, in which admissible strategies are assumed to be constant on the interval between consecutive measurements. Our solution first involves transforming the problem into a linear stochastic system with finite jumps. This allows us to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions assuring the existence of a sampled-data Nash equilibrium strategy, extending earlier results to a general context with more than two players. Furthermore, we provide a numerical algorithm for calculating the feedback matrices of the Nash equilibrium strategies. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm by two numerical examples. As both situations highlight a stabilization effect, this confirms the efficiency of our approach.https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/21/2713nash equilibriastochastic LQ differential gamessampled-data controlsequilibrium strategiesoptimal trajectories
spellingShingle Vasile Drăgan
Ivan Ganchev Ivanov
Ioan-Lucian Popa
Ovidiu Bagdasar
Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games
Mathematics
nash equilibria
stochastic LQ differential games
sampled-data controls
equilibrium strategies
optimal trajectories
title Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games
title_full Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games
title_fullStr Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games
title_full_unstemmed Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games
title_short Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium in the Class of Piecewise Constant Strategies in a Linear State Feedback Form for Stochastic LQ Games
title_sort closed loop nash equilibrium in the class of piecewise constant strategies in a linear state feedback form for stochastic lq games
topic nash equilibria
stochastic LQ differential games
sampled-data controls
equilibrium strategies
optimal trajectories
url https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/21/2713
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AT ioanlucianpopa closedloopnashequilibriumintheclassofpiecewiseconstantstrategiesinalinearstatefeedbackformforstochasticlqgames
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