Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
This paper deals with the treatment of figures of speech in Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (TA), and, more broadly, with the place of figures in argumentation theory. The contrast between “a rhetoric of figures” and “a rhetoric of argument,” which can be traced back to R...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fra |
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University of Tel-Aviv
2009-04-01
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| Series: | Argumentation et Analyse du Discours |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/aad/215 |
| _version_ | 1819015987034324992 |
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| author | Christian Plantin |
| author_facet | Christian Plantin |
| author_sort | Christian Plantin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper deals with the treatment of figures of speech in Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (TA), and, more broadly, with the place of figures in argumentation theory. The contrast between “a rhetoric of figures” and “a rhetoric of argument,” which can be traced back to Ramus, was revived in the seventies by the perception of an incommensurability between TA and the École de Liège’s “General Rhetoric”. Modern theories of argumentation, oriented towards characterizing and denouncing fallacious discourse, emphasize the gap between sound argumentative discourse and discourse that is a « powerful instrument of error and deceit » (Locke). This concept of a gap envisions language as ideal / transparent - a revised language that is not the language of ordinary argumentation. In contrast, we argue that figures are not basically “decorative”; they are manifestations of the complex process of language structuring in speech. Thus rejecting figures amounts to a negation of discourse as such. We then turn to a somewhat neglected aspect of the TA, its both decisive and somewhat cavalier theory of figures of speech, and its extended use and re-definition of a complex set of figures. We argue that the TA, in its quest for descriptive adequacy, breaks with the traditional and comfortable concept of figures as useless fallacious “ornaments”, and provides us with the first description of what could be characterized as the semantic level of ordinary argumentative discourse. This will be shown on the case of “figures of choice, presence and communion”, and could be extended to the discursive construction of objects and participants, including the speaker and her emotions. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T02:40:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-699c9f6a6fc243728fca5590904b648d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1565-8961 |
| language | fra |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T02:40:27Z |
| publishDate | 2009-04-01 |
| publisher | University of Tel-Aviv |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Argumentation et Analyse du Discours |
| spelling | doaj.art-699c9f6a6fc243728fca5590904b648d2022-12-21T19:18:41ZfraUniversity of Tel-AvivArgumentation et Analyse du Discours1565-89612009-04-01210.4000/aad.215Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentationChristian PlantinThis paper deals with the treatment of figures of speech in Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (TA), and, more broadly, with the place of figures in argumentation theory. The contrast between “a rhetoric of figures” and “a rhetoric of argument,” which can be traced back to Ramus, was revived in the seventies by the perception of an incommensurability between TA and the École de Liège’s “General Rhetoric”. Modern theories of argumentation, oriented towards characterizing and denouncing fallacious discourse, emphasize the gap between sound argumentative discourse and discourse that is a « powerful instrument of error and deceit » (Locke). This concept of a gap envisions language as ideal / transparent - a revised language that is not the language of ordinary argumentation. In contrast, we argue that figures are not basically “decorative”; they are manifestations of the complex process of language structuring in speech. Thus rejecting figures amounts to a negation of discourse as such. We then turn to a somewhat neglected aspect of the TA, its both decisive and somewhat cavalier theory of figures of speech, and its extended use and re-definition of a complex set of figures. We argue that the TA, in its quest for descriptive adequacy, breaks with the traditional and comfortable concept of figures as useless fallacious “ornaments”, and provides us with the first description of what could be characterized as the semantic level of ordinary argumentative discourse. This will be shown on the case of “figures of choice, presence and communion”, and could be extended to the discursive construction of objects and participants, including the speaker and her emotions.http://journals.openedition.org/aad/215discursive modulediscursive objectfallacyfigureornamentsemantic of discourse |
| spellingShingle | Christian Plantin Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation Argumentation et Analyse du Discours discursive module discursive object fallacy figure ornament semantic of discourse |
| title | Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation |
| title_full | Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation |
| title_fullStr | Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation |
| title_short | Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation |
| title_sort | un lieu pour les figures dans la theorie de l argumentation |
| topic | discursive module discursive object fallacy figure ornament semantic of discourse |
| url | http://journals.openedition.org/aad/215 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT christianplantin unlieupourlesfiguresdanslatheoriedelargumentation |