Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand
This paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We first establish three games, including manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS) and Nash according to the different power stru...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Sciendo
2023-07-01
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| Series: | Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2022.1.00101 |
| _version_ | 1797266148357570560 |
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| author | Ma Chao Huang Fuyou Hu Yongwen |
| author_facet | Ma Chao Huang Fuyou Hu Yongwen |
| author_sort | Ma Chao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We first establish three games, including manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS) and Nash according to the different power structure of the firms. We then determine that the equilibrium stocking factors, emission reduction levels, wholesale prices and retail prices for the three models, respectively. After that, we demonstrate the effects of power structure. Results show that when the power shifts from the retailer to the manufacturer, the stocking factor decreases, whereas the wholesale price increases. Finally, we discuss the impacts of the random demand. We find that the expected profits of the firms, the emission reduction levels and the retail prices are increasing with respect to the market potential and low-carbon sensitivity coefficient, respectively. Meanwhile, they decrease with respect to the price sensitivity coefficient. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T16:19:43Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-69f18f1db32a451f95dd0073de07ad90 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2444-8656 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-25T00:56:05Z |
| publishDate | 2023-07-01 |
| publisher | Sciendo |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-69f18f1db32a451f95dd0073de07ad902024-03-11T10:05:45ZengSciendoApplied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences2444-86562023-07-018211810.2478/amns.2022.1.00101Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demandMa Chao0Huang Fuyou1Hu Yongwen21Hubei Key Laboratory of Power System Design and Test for Electrical Vehicle, Hubei University of Arts and Science, Xiangyang, 441053, China3Institute of Transportation Development Strategy & Planning of Sichuan Province, Chengdu610041, China1Hubei Key Laboratory of Power System Design and Test for Electrical Vehicle, Hubei University of Arts and Science, Xiangyang, 441053, ChinaThis paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We first establish three games, including manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS) and Nash according to the different power structure of the firms. We then determine that the equilibrium stocking factors, emission reduction levels, wholesale prices and retail prices for the three models, respectively. After that, we demonstrate the effects of power structure. Results show that when the power shifts from the retailer to the manufacturer, the stocking factor decreases, whereas the wholesale price increases. Finally, we discuss the impacts of the random demand. We find that the expected profits of the firms, the emission reduction levels and the retail prices are increasing with respect to the market potential and low-carbon sensitivity coefficient, respectively. Meanwhile, they decrease with respect to the price sensitivity coefficient.https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2022.1.00101low carbondemand uncertaintypower structuregame theory90b50 |
| spellingShingle | Ma Chao Huang Fuyou Hu Yongwen Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences low carbon demand uncertainty power structure game theory 90b50 |
| title | Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand |
| title_full | Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand |
| title_fullStr | Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand |
| title_short | Game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand |
| title_sort | game theoretic model for low carbon supply chain under carbon emissions reduction sensitive random demand |
| topic | low carbon demand uncertainty power structure game theory 90b50 |
| url | https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2022.1.00101 |
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