Debiasing context effects in strategic decisions: Playing against a consistent opponent can correct perceptual but not reinforcement biases
Vlaev and Chater (2006) demonstrated that the cooperativeness of previously seen prisoner’s dilemma games biases choices and predictions in the current game. These effects were: a) assimilation to the mean cooperativeness of the played games caused by action reinforcement, and b) perceptual contrast...
Main Authors: | Ivo Vlaev, Nick Chater |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2008-08-01
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Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500000048/type/journal_article |
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