Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks
With the development of cognitive radio networks in recent years, spectrum utilization has been enhanced, as secondary users can lease under-utilized spectrum from the spectrum owners. Spectrum is allocated through auctions in wireless communication networks. The auction can provide benefits for bot...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
IEEE
2018-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8350367/ |
| _version_ | 1831538812613820416 |
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| author | Xiangping Zhai Tianqi Zhou Chunsheng Zhu Bing Chen Weidong Fang Kun Zhu |
| author_facet | Xiangping Zhai Tianqi Zhou Chunsheng Zhu Bing Chen Weidong Fang Kun Zhu |
| author_sort | Xiangping Zhai |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the development of cognitive radio networks in recent years, spectrum utilization has been enhanced, as secondary users can lease under-utilized spectrum from the spectrum owners. Spectrum is allocated through auctions in wireless communication networks. The auction can provide benefits for both primary users and secondary users. Existing auction mechanisms for spectrum are mainly based on interference graphs and consider the heterogeneity of spectrums only to a minimal degree. The economic efficiency of the auction is usually neglected due to the focus on improving spectrum utilization. In this paper, we consider a signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constrained interference model; this model is more realistic as users can simultaneously communicate as long as their requirements SINRs are satisfied. We propose a truthful profit maximization double auction mechanism to improve the benefit of networks with low energy. At the same time, security concerns are guaranteed because buyers and sellers make their true critical decision, i.e., they cannot improve their utility by misreporting their asks and bids. Moreover, our proposed novel auction mechanism is individually rational and budget-balanced. The experiments demonstrate that our auction mechanism efficiently increases the number of winners and improves the auctioneer's profit. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-16T23:30:12Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6a73c4c654aa4c4a9c9309b427018f90 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-16T23:30:12Z |
| publishDate | 2018-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-6a73c4c654aa4c4a9c9309b427018f902022-12-21T22:11:54ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362018-01-016231802319010.1109/ACCESS.2018.28175168350367Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio NetworksXiangping Zhai0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8939-199XTianqi Zhou1Chunsheng Zhu2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8041-0197Bing Chen3Weidong Fang4Kun Zhu5Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, ChinaNanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, ChinaDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, CanadaNanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, ChinaKey Laboratory of Wireless Sensor Network and Communication, Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shanghai, ChinaNanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, ChinaWith the development of cognitive radio networks in recent years, spectrum utilization has been enhanced, as secondary users can lease under-utilized spectrum from the spectrum owners. Spectrum is allocated through auctions in wireless communication networks. The auction can provide benefits for both primary users and secondary users. Existing auction mechanisms for spectrum are mainly based on interference graphs and consider the heterogeneity of spectrums only to a minimal degree. The economic efficiency of the auction is usually neglected due to the focus on improving spectrum utilization. In this paper, we consider a signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constrained interference model; this model is more realistic as users can simultaneously communicate as long as their requirements SINRs are satisfied. We propose a truthful profit maximization double auction mechanism to improve the benefit of networks with low energy. At the same time, security concerns are guaranteed because buyers and sellers make their true critical decision, i.e., they cannot improve their utility by misreporting their asks and bids. Moreover, our proposed novel auction mechanism is individually rational and budget-balanced. The experiments demonstrate that our auction mechanism efficiently increases the number of winners and improves the auctioneer's profit.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8350367/Double auctiontruthfulnessenergy efficiencyprofit maximizationspectrum sharing |
| spellingShingle | Xiangping Zhai Tianqi Zhou Chunsheng Zhu Bing Chen Weidong Fang Kun Zhu Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks IEEE Access Double auction truthfulness energy efficiency profit maximization spectrum sharing |
| title | Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks |
| title_full | Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks |
| title_fullStr | Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks |
| title_short | Truthful Double Auction for Joint Internet of Energy and Profit Optimization in Cognitive Radio Networks |
| title_sort | truthful double auction for joint internet of energy and profit optimization in cognitive radio networks |
| topic | Double auction truthfulness energy efficiency profit maximization spectrum sharing |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8350367/ |
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