An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination
The innovation and regulatory coordination of digital currency is an important proposition in the new era of Fintech. There is increasing competition between traditional currencies and new digital currencies, so a spontaneous game model of currencies is analyzed. By introducing the role of financial...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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AIMS Press
2023-03-01
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| Series: | Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2023396?viewType=HTML |
| _version_ | 1797852983650680832 |
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| author | Bo Lan Lei Zhuang Qin Zhou |
| author_facet | Bo Lan Lei Zhuang Qin Zhou |
| author_sort | Bo Lan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The innovation and regulatory coordination of digital currency is an important proposition in the new era of Fintech. There is increasing competition between traditional currencies and new digital currencies, so a spontaneous game model of currencies is analyzed. By introducing the role of financial coordination, this paper revises the evolutionary game model of digital currency innovation, and analyzes their competition strategies through case and simulation. The results show that: first, the dominant result of digital currency spontaneous game is that both parties tend to digital cooperation strategy. Second, with the introduction of financial regulation, the dominant result of digital currency tripartite evolutionary game is that financial institutions tend to participate in coordination and both currency parties tend to cooperate. Third, the choice strategy of currency is more sensitive to the changes of willingness to participate in cooperation, cooperation costs and cooperation benefits of financial coordination. The selection strategy of financial coordination institutions for digital currency is more influenced by changes in cooperation costs and incentive return in the process of participating in cooperation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-09T19:43:13Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6ab597331f244227aeed976a9325cd21 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1551-0018 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-09T19:43:13Z |
| publishDate | 2023-03-01 |
| publisher | AIMS Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering |
| spelling | doaj.art-6ab597331f244227aeed976a9325cd212023-04-04T01:30:10ZengAIMS PressMathematical Biosciences and Engineering1551-00182023-03-012059018904010.3934/mbe.2023396An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordinationBo Lan0Lei Zhuang1Qin Zhou21. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, China1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, ChinaThe innovation and regulatory coordination of digital currency is an important proposition in the new era of Fintech. There is increasing competition between traditional currencies and new digital currencies, so a spontaneous game model of currencies is analyzed. By introducing the role of financial coordination, this paper revises the evolutionary game model of digital currency innovation, and analyzes their competition strategies through case and simulation. The results show that: first, the dominant result of digital currency spontaneous game is that both parties tend to digital cooperation strategy. Second, with the introduction of financial regulation, the dominant result of digital currency tripartite evolutionary game is that financial institutions tend to participate in coordination and both currency parties tend to cooperate. Third, the choice strategy of currency is more sensitive to the changes of willingness to participate in cooperation, cooperation costs and cooperation benefits of financial coordination. The selection strategy of financial coordination institutions for digital currency is more influenced by changes in cooperation costs and incentive return in the process of participating in cooperation.https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2023396?viewType=HTMLdigital currencyfintechcurrencies competitionfinancial regulatory coordinationevolutionary game |
| spellingShingle | Bo Lan Lei Zhuang Qin Zhou An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering digital currency fintech currencies competition financial regulatory coordination evolutionary game |
| title | An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination |
| title_full | An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination |
| title_fullStr | An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination |
| title_full_unstemmed | An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination |
| title_short | An evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination |
| title_sort | evolutionary game analysis of digital currency innovation and regulatory coordination |
| topic | digital currency fintech currencies competition financial regulatory coordination evolutionary game |
| url | https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2023396?viewType=HTML |
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