A Security Model for Randomization-based Protected Caches

A Security Model for Randomization-based Protected Caches

Cache side-channel attacks allow adversaries to learn sensitive information about co-running processes by using only access latency measures and cache contention. This vulnerability has been shown to lead to several microarchitectural attacks. As a promising solution, recent work proposes Randomiza...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jordi Ribes-González, Oriol Farràs, Carles Hernández, Vatistas Kostalabros, Miquel Moretó
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2022-06-01
Series:Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Subjects:
Cache side-channel attacks
Timing attacks
Randomization-based protected caches
Randomly-mapped caches
Pseudo-random functions
Security definition
Online Access:https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9693

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