Intentionality, Object and Sense in Alexius Meinong’s Gegenstandstheori
Meinong’s ‘theory of objects’ is a radicalization of Brentano’s intentionalist theory which widens the universe of objects, since every act has a transcendent object as a correlate. The article focuses on two main issues: on the one hand, the object–as correlate of representations –that might be exi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca
2016-07-01
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| Series: | Azafea: Revista de Filosofía |
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| Online Access: | http://revistas.usal.es/index.php/0213-3563/article/view/11983 |
| Summary: | Meinong’s ‘theory of objects’ is a radicalization of Brentano’s intentionalist theory which widens the universe of objects, since every act has a transcendent object as a correlate. The article focuses on two main issues: on the one hand, the object–as correlate of representations –that might be existent, subsistent or nonexistent (and even impossible); on the other hand, the ‘objective’–as correlate of judgments and assumptions–; I will argue that the problem of nonexistent objects finds its solution here, i.e. within the sphere of propositional acts. The aim will be to show how an authentic intentionalist theory leads necessarily to a theory of objects that gives an account of every kind of object. |
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| ISSN: | 0213-3563 2444-7072 |