The Asymmetry objection in Rawls's political philosophy: Assessing a solution
In this paper, after a short review of the conception of justification in political philosophy, I describe the concept of 'burdens of judgment' in Rawls's political philosophy and show how the effects of the conception prevent people from reaching agreements on the most political, mor...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
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Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2017-03-01
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| Series: | حکمت و فلسفه |
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| Online Access: | https://wph.atu.ac.ir/article_7620_a3e96622c921cc8d9297a9c442357a7c.pdf |
| Summary: | In this paper, after a short review of the conception of justification in political philosophy, I describe the concept of 'burdens of judgment' in Rawls's political philosophy and show how the effects of the conception prevent people from reaching agreements on the most political, moral or religious judgments. Then, I describe the 'Asymmetry Objection' to Rawls's political philosophy and mention some contemporary political reactions to it briefly. I'll then take Quong's solution for this objection. This solution is based on a distinction between two different kinds of disagreements which are called foundational and justificatory disagreements respectively. Quong claims that the mentioned distinction corresponds the distinction between the disagreements concerning the matters of justice and disagreements concerning the matters of good. After describing Quong's solution, I'll criticize it and through some points concerning the epistemology of disagreement show what revisions it should have if it supposed to work and solve the problem. |
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| ISSN: | 1735-3238 2476-6038 |