ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTS

Objective: comparative analysis of reflexive and non-reflexive strategies of market agents’ behavior in accordance withStackelberg equilibrium.Methods: game theory, economic and mathematical modeling.Results: modeling of information equilibria of the Russian telecommunications market is carried out....

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: I. A. Biryukova, M. I. Geras’kin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Tatar Educational Center “Taglimat” Ltd. 2018-09-01
Series:Russian Journal of Economics and Law
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/2128
_version_ 1797255866509950976
author I. A. Biryukova
M. I. Geras’kin
author_facet I. A. Biryukova
M. I. Geras’kin
author_sort I. A. Biryukova
collection DOAJ
description Objective: comparative analysis of reflexive and non-reflexive strategies of market agents’ behavior in accordance withStackelberg equilibrium.Methods: game theory, economic and mathematical modeling.Results: modeling of information equilibria of the Russian telecommunications market is carried out. In the game of three oligopolists on arbitrary ranks of strategic reflection of two of them, the possible variants of equilibria are analyzed; the solution of all available variants of equilibria on arbitrary ranks of reflection at linear functions of demand and expenses is received. Modeling of information equilibria of the Russian telecommunications market showed possible strategies to improve the agents’ market positions.Scientific novelty: the equilibrium in the market of oligopoly with three agents is considered, two of which reflect, and the third acts in accordance with their ideas. The reflexive behavior of the oligopoly market agents leads to a significant shift in the market equilibrium in comparison with non-reflexive behavior, while the strategy of the non-reflexive agent is ineffective in all cases, since its market share decreases with an increase in the reflection rank.Practical significance: the obtained informational equilibria can be used for comparison with the structure of the Russian telecommunications market to determine the type of the companies’ reflexive behavior.
first_indexed 2024-03-08T23:15:25Z
format Article
id doaj.art-6d674308474c4408bb37f76ed128bec2
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 2782-2923
language English
last_indexed 2024-04-24T22:12:39Z
publishDate 2018-09-01
publisher Tatar Educational Center “Taglimat” Ltd.
record_format Article
series Russian Journal of Economics and Law
spelling doaj.art-6d674308474c4408bb37f76ed128bec22024-03-20T08:16:51ZengTatar Educational Center “Taglimat” Ltd.Russian Journal of Economics and Law2782-29232018-09-0112346848010.21202/1993-047X.12.2018.3.468-4802126ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTSI. A. Biryukova0M. I. Geras’kin1Samara National Research University named after Academician S. P. Korolev (Samara University)Samara National Research University named after Academician S. P. Korolev (Samara University)Objective: comparative analysis of reflexive and non-reflexive strategies of market agents’ behavior in accordance withStackelberg equilibrium.Methods: game theory, economic and mathematical modeling.Results: modeling of information equilibria of the Russian telecommunications market is carried out. In the game of three oligopolists on arbitrary ranks of strategic reflection of two of them, the possible variants of equilibria are analyzed; the solution of all available variants of equilibria on arbitrary ranks of reflection at linear functions of demand and expenses is received. Modeling of information equilibria of the Russian telecommunications market showed possible strategies to improve the agents’ market positions.Scientific novelty: the equilibrium in the market of oligopoly with three agents is considered, two of which reflect, and the third acts in accordance with their ideas. The reflexive behavior of the oligopoly market agents leads to a significant shift in the market equilibrium in comparison with non-reflexive behavior, while the strategy of the non-reflexive agent is ineffective in all cases, since its market share decreases with an increase in the reflection rank.Practical significance: the obtained informational equilibria can be used for comparison with the structure of the Russian telecommunications market to determine the type of the companies’ reflexive behavior.https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/2128экономика и управление народным хозяйствомрефлексивная играолигополияэкономика и управление народным хозяйствомрефлексивная играолигополияравновесиекурно - штакельбергателекоммуникационный рынок
spellingShingle I. A. Biryukova
M. I. Geras’kin
ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTS
Russian Journal of Economics and Law
экономика и управление народным хозяйством
рефлексивная игра
олигополия
экономика и управление народным хозяйством
рефлексивная игра
олигополия
равновесиекурно - штакельберга
телекоммуникационный рынок
title ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTS
title_full ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTS
title_fullStr ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTS
title_full_unstemmed ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTS
title_short ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE GAME OF AGENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET FOR A CASE OF TWO REFLECTIVE AGENTS
title_sort analysis of reflective game of agents in telecommunications market for a case of two reflective agents
topic экономика и управление народным хозяйством
рефлексивная игра
олигополия
экономика и управление народным хозяйством
рефлексивная игра
олигополия
равновесиекурно - штакельберга
телекоммуникационный рынок
url https://www.rusjel.ru/jour/article/view/2128
work_keys_str_mv AT iabiryukova analysisofreflectivegameofagentsintelecommunicationsmarketforacaseoftworeflectiveagents
AT migeraskin analysisofreflectivegameofagentsintelecommunicationsmarketforacaseoftworeflectiveagents