| Summary: | Distributed energy resources (DERs) are deployed vastly to reduce carbon emission, improve power
quality and maintain the reliability of distribution systems. With the
introduction of new players, such as prosumers, which are constructed with DERs,
distribution system operators (DSOs) are facing changes in the retail
electricity market. Prosumers need a well-defined strategic bidding mechanism to
maximize their operation revenue, while DSOs need a new market clearing
mechanism for the changed retail electricity market. Thus, an innovative
game-theoretic market framework for a prosumer-centric retail electricity market
is proposed. A bilevel algorithm is adopted to model new features of DSOs,
utility companies and prosumers. The supply function equilibrium model,
Nikaido–Isoda functions, and relaxation algorithms are applied to analyse the
competition among key participants in a retail electricity market. Extensive
simulation results are employed to illustrate and validate the effectiveness of
the proposed framework for bidding strategies of prosumers with a retail
electricity market. Specifically, the strategy with dumping-bid or abnormal-bid
from a prosumer is suppressed by the market operator in the model. Moreover, the
sensitivity analysis shows that the proposed framework can handle various
numbers of prosumers in the retail electricity market with reasonable
computational time and convergence rate.
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