The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing
There are various regulatory mechanisms to coordinate vulnerability disclosure behaviors during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing. However, in the case of unclear regulatory effectiveness, enterprises cannot obtain sufficient vulnerability information, third-party crowdsourcing cybersecurity testi...
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| Fformat: | Erthygl |
| Iaith: | English |
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AIMS Press
2023-10-01
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| Cyfres: | Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering |
| Pynciau: | |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2023841?viewType=HTML |
| _version_ | 1827767701396783104 |
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| author | Liurong Zhao Xiaoxi Yu Xinyu Zhou |
| author_facet | Liurong Zhao Xiaoxi Yu Xinyu Zhou |
| author_sort | Liurong Zhao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | There are various regulatory mechanisms to coordinate vulnerability disclosure behaviors during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing. However, in the case of unclear regulatory effectiveness, enterprises cannot obtain sufficient vulnerability information, third-party crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing platforms fail to provide trusted services, and the government lacks strong credibility. We have constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary process of the equilibrium of {legal disclosure, active operation, strict regulation}, and the paper reveals the impact of three regulatory mechanisms. We find that these participants' positive behaviors are in a stable state. Higher initial willingness accelerates the speed of reaching the evolutionary stability of the system, and this equilibrium is satisfied only if the governmental regulatory benefits are sufficiently high. Regarding the punishment mechanism, increased punishment for enterprises causes them to adopt positive behaviors faster, while the opposite occurs for platforms; increased punishment for platforms drives both participants to adopt positive behaviors faster. Concerning the subsidy mechanism, increased subsidy to enterprises causes them to adopt legal disclosure behaviors faster, while platforms remain unresponsive; increased subsidy to platforms motivates both players to choose their own positive behaviors. In terms of the collaborative disclosure mechanism, excessive collaborative costs reduce the platforms' willingness to operate actively, which decreases the enterprises' incentives to disclose vulnerability legally. These findings guide the government to establish suitable mechanisms to regulate the participants' behavior and promote the healthy development of the cybersecurity crowdsourcing industry. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T12:01:42Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-6ded410f8ba34b608014b51a86b76c8b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1551-0018 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T12:01:42Z |
| publishDate | 2023-10-01 |
| publisher | AIMS Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering |
| spelling | doaj.art-6ded410f8ba34b608014b51a86b76c8b2023-11-08T01:26:48ZengAIMS PressMathematical Biosciences and Engineering1551-00182023-10-012011190121903910.3934/mbe.2023841The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testingLiurong Zhao0Xiaoxi Yu1Xinyu Zhou2School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, ChinaThere are various regulatory mechanisms to coordinate vulnerability disclosure behaviors during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing. However, in the case of unclear regulatory effectiveness, enterprises cannot obtain sufficient vulnerability information, third-party crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing platforms fail to provide trusted services, and the government lacks strong credibility. We have constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary process of the equilibrium of {legal disclosure, active operation, strict regulation}, and the paper reveals the impact of three regulatory mechanisms. We find that these participants' positive behaviors are in a stable state. Higher initial willingness accelerates the speed of reaching the evolutionary stability of the system, and this equilibrium is satisfied only if the governmental regulatory benefits are sufficiently high. Regarding the punishment mechanism, increased punishment for enterprises causes them to adopt positive behaviors faster, while the opposite occurs for platforms; increased punishment for platforms drives both participants to adopt positive behaviors faster. Concerning the subsidy mechanism, increased subsidy to enterprises causes them to adopt legal disclosure behaviors faster, while platforms remain unresponsive; increased subsidy to platforms motivates both players to choose their own positive behaviors. In terms of the collaborative disclosure mechanism, excessive collaborative costs reduce the platforms' willingness to operate actively, which decreases the enterprises' incentives to disclose vulnerability legally. These findings guide the government to establish suitable mechanisms to regulate the participants' behavior and promote the healthy development of the cybersecurity crowdsourcing industry.https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2023841?viewType=HTMLcybersecurityvulnerability disclosure behaviorregulatory mechanismthird-party crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing platformwhite-hat hackerstripartite evolutionary game |
| spellingShingle | Liurong Zhao Xiaoxi Yu Xinyu Zhou The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering cybersecurity vulnerability disclosure behavior regulatory mechanism third-party crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing platform white-hat hackers tripartite evolutionary game |
| title | The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing |
| title_full | The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing |
| title_fullStr | The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing |
| title_full_unstemmed | The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing |
| title_short | The impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing |
| title_sort | impact of regulatory mechanisms on vulnerability disclosure behavior during crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing |
| topic | cybersecurity vulnerability disclosure behavior regulatory mechanism third-party crowdsourcing cybersecurity testing platform white-hat hackers tripartite evolutionary game |
| url | https://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2023841?viewType=HTML |
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