Déflationnisme et conservativité : quelqu’un a-t-il changé de sujet ?
[Shapiro 1998b] and [Ketland 1999] have argued against deflationary views of truth on the ground that an adequate truth-theoretic extension of a theory is a non-conservative extension. We clarify the argument and offer an alternative interpretation of the observed non-conservativeness phenomenon, co...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Éditions Kimé
2012-11-01
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| Series: | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/785 |
| Summary: | [Shapiro 1998b] and [Ketland 1999] have argued against deflationary views of truth on the ground that an adequate truth-theoretic extension of a theory is a non-conservative extension. We clarify the argument and offer an alternative interpretation of the observed non-conservativeness phenomenon, compatible both with the logical facts and the deflationist’s thesis. |
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| ISSN: | 1281-2463 1775-4283 |