Evaluative Beliefs in a Thought Theoretical Framework? A Proposal For Non-positing Epistemic States
Thought Theory (TT) seems to provide an answer to the paradox of fiction (PoF) which has the ontological merits of current pretence accounts without, however, assuming mere pretence emotions. This article will question whether present formulations of TT live up to what they promise. Whenever its cur...
Main Author: | Simone Neuber |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Helsinki University Press
2015-05-01
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Series: | Estetika |
Online Access: | https://estetikajournal.org/articles/131 |
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