Systemic and Non-Systemic Corruption in Education: the Game Model
The aim of the article is to analyze the existing practices of corruption in higher education and their impact on its quality index as well as develop recommendations on their overcoming. Game methods to analyze the corrupt interaction in the process of getting education are proposed. There ident...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
PH "INZHEK"
2016-11-01
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| Series: | Problemi Ekonomiki |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.problecon.com/export_pdf/problems-of-economy-2016-4_0-pages-273_278.pdf |
| Summary: | The aim of the article is to analyze the existing practices of corruption in
higher education and their impact on its quality index as well as develop
recommendations on their overcoming. Game methods to analyze the corrupt
interaction in the process of getting education are proposed. There identified
two categories of lecturers taking bribes: professional bribe-takers and
amateurs. It is emphasized that the existence of professionals is only possible
under conditions of systemic corruption when part of the risk is passed on
to the university administration. The activity of amateurs is analyzed using
gaming technologies. The payoff matrices of the student and the teacher are
built, the latter includes the likelihood of detection and possible punishment
for corruption. It is shown that under current conditions there is saddle point
when both the student and the teacher use illegal strategies. The transition
to a mixed strategy is possible only in case of a significant increase in the
probability of detecting acts of corruption on the part of the teacher or the
increase of the size of punishment for corruption. Significant improvements
are possible in the case when the population will change views on the
effectiveness of knowledge as a source of human capital. |
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| ISSN: | 2222-0712 2311-1186 |