Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"?
In cartel cases, there are good policy reasons to investigate all cartel members and to address a decision to each of them. Yet, the case is different when it comes to vertical infringements. Vertical infringements often involve more undertakings, but their continued existence depends on the partici...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Warsaw
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://yars.wz.uw.edu.pl/images/yars2023_16_27/YARS_1627_2023_4-JPolanski.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797448404973912064 |
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| author | Jan Polański |
| author_facet | Jan Polański |
| author_sort | Jan Polański |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In cartel cases, there are good policy reasons to investigate all cartel members and to address a decision to each of them. Yet, the case is different when it comes to vertical infringements. Vertical infringements often involve more undertakings, but their continued existence depends on the participation of e.g. wholesalers. In consequence, antitrust authorities might be interested in pursuing a policy of selective enforcement and targeting investigations at single undertakings, even despite the fact that such infringements are multi-party ones. This, however, raises concerns whether such an approach is valid and how it affects the rights of defence. Taking into account that the European Commission’s return to RPM cases in 2018 provided national competition authorities (NCAs) with additional incentives to investigate vertical cases, this article reflects on what might be the reaction of the European Court of Justice (CJEU), if the aforementioned approach is questioned either during an appeals procedure or within a preliminary request. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T14:10:51Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-705aab53baa54e1180cdb4b76e7acf18 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1689-9024 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T14:10:51Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | University of Warsaw |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies |
| spelling | doaj.art-705aab53baa54e1180cdb4b76e7acf182023-11-29T11:35:55ZengUniversity of WarsawYearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies1689-90242023-11-0116278311010.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2023.16.27.3Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"?Jan Polański0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4048-1860Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK)In cartel cases, there are good policy reasons to investigate all cartel members and to address a decision to each of them. Yet, the case is different when it comes to vertical infringements. Vertical infringements often involve more undertakings, but their continued existence depends on the participation of e.g. wholesalers. In consequence, antitrust authorities might be interested in pursuing a policy of selective enforcement and targeting investigations at single undertakings, even despite the fact that such infringements are multi-party ones. This, however, raises concerns whether such an approach is valid and how it affects the rights of defence. Taking into account that the European Commission’s return to RPM cases in 2018 provided national competition authorities (NCAs) with additional incentives to investigate vertical cases, this article reflects on what might be the reaction of the European Court of Justice (CJEU), if the aforementioned approach is questioned either during an appeals procedure or within a preliminary request.https://yars.wz.uw.edu.pl/images/yars2023_16_27/YARS_1627_2023_4-JPolanski.pdfselective enforcementprocedurevertical agreementsprocedural autonomydue process |
| spellingShingle | Jan Polański Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"? Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies selective enforcement procedure vertical agreements procedural autonomy due process |
| title | Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"? |
| title_full | Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"? |
| title_fullStr | Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"? |
| title_short | Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"? |
| title_sort | selective enforcement and multi party antitrust infringements how to handle unilateral agreements |
| topic | selective enforcement procedure vertical agreements procedural autonomy due process |
| url | https://yars.wz.uw.edu.pl/images/yars2023_16_27/YARS_1627_2023_4-JPolanski.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT janpolanski selectiveenforcementandmultipartyantitrustinfringementshowtohandleunilateralagreements |