Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance
This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001–2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to cross-list as B...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Taylor & Francis Group
2014-12-01
|
Series: | Cogent Economics & Finance |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2014.967361 |
_version_ | 1818108803465347072 |
---|---|
author | Yongli Luo |
author_facet | Yongli Luo |
author_sort | Yongli Luo |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001–2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to cross-list as B- or H-shares; it implies that cross-listings could be employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers’ discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is important in determining cross-listings. Under the weak corporate governance institution, Chinese firms were chosen to cross-list based on political considerations rather than on economic merits, serving as a vehicle to signal the quality of state owned enterprises. The results are drawn on agency theory, signalling hypothesis and bonding hypothesis. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-11T02:21:10Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-706cf8c9fa314056bdf85ef5bb5179ab |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2332-2039 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-11T02:21:10Z |
publishDate | 2014-12-01 |
publisher | Taylor & Francis Group |
record_format | Article |
series | Cogent Economics & Finance |
spelling | doaj.art-706cf8c9fa314056bdf85ef5bb5179ab2022-12-22T01:24:04ZengTaylor & Francis GroupCogent Economics & Finance2332-20392014-12-012110.1080/23322039.2014.967361967361Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governanceYongli Luo0Wayland Baptist UniversityThis study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001–2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to cross-list as B- or H-shares; it implies that cross-listings could be employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers’ discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is important in determining cross-listings. Under the weak corporate governance institution, Chinese firms were chosen to cross-list based on political considerations rather than on economic merits, serving as a vehicle to signal the quality of state owned enterprises. The results are drawn on agency theory, signalling hypothesis and bonding hypothesis.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2014.967361cross-listingexecutive compensationcorporate governanceChina |
spellingShingle | Yongli Luo Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance Cogent Economics & Finance cross-listing executive compensation corporate governance China |
title | Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance |
title_full | Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance |
title_fullStr | Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance |
title_full_unstemmed | Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance |
title_short | Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance |
title_sort | cross listing managerial compensation and corporate governance |
topic | cross-listing executive compensation corporate governance China |
url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2014.967361 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT yongliluo crosslistingmanagerialcompensationandcorporategovernance |