Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism

One prominent ambition of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to us; and another to reconcile this first-personal perspective on colours with the third-personal one of the natural sciences. The goal of this article is to question whether we can satisfy the...

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Main Author: Fabian Dorsch
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Rosenberg & Sellier 2010-03-01
Series:Rivista di Estetica
Online Access:http://journals.openedition.org/estetica/1794
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author Fabian Dorsch
author_facet Fabian Dorsch
author_sort Fabian Dorsch
collection DOAJ
description One prominent ambition of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to us; and another to reconcile this first-personal perspective on colours with the third-personal one of the natural sciences. The goal of this article is to question whether we can satisfy the second ambition on the assumption that the first should and can be met. I aim to defend a negative answer to this question by arguing that the various kinds of experienced colour resemblances – notably similarities in hue distance, sameness in superdeterminables, and colour resemblances between surfaces, volumes and illuminants – cannot be accounted for in terms of the mental representation of the scientifically studied properties, which colours are best identified with in response to the second ambition.
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spelling doaj.art-70fda094152d44d1807f145647b70a9e2022-12-21T23:20:05ZengRosenberg & SellierRivista di Estetica0035-62122421-58642010-03-01438510810.4000/estetica.1794Colour Resemblance and Colour RealismFabian DorschOne prominent ambition of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to us; and another to reconcile this first-personal perspective on colours with the third-personal one of the natural sciences. The goal of this article is to question whether we can satisfy the second ambition on the assumption that the first should and can be met. I aim to defend a negative answer to this question by arguing that the various kinds of experienced colour resemblances – notably similarities in hue distance, sameness in superdeterminables, and colour resemblances between surfaces, volumes and illuminants – cannot be accounted for in terms of the mental representation of the scientifically studied properties, which colours are best identified with in response to the second ambition.http://journals.openedition.org/estetica/1794
spellingShingle Fabian Dorsch
Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism
Rivista di Estetica
title Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism
title_full Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism
title_fullStr Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism
title_full_unstemmed Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism
title_short Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism
title_sort colour resemblance and colour realism
url http://journals.openedition.org/estetica/1794
work_keys_str_mv AT fabiandorsch colourresemblanceandcolourrealism