Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information ca...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Paderborn University: Media Systems and Media Organisation Research Group
2011-10-01
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| Series: | tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/285 |
| Summary: | Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske’s approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge. |
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| ISSN: | 1726-670X 1726-670X |