Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach

Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information ca...

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Main Authors: José María Díaz Nafría, Mario Pérez-Montoro
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Paderborn University: Media Systems and Media Organisation Research Group 2011-10-01
Series:tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/285
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author José María Díaz Nafría
Mario Pérez-Montoro
author_facet José María Díaz Nafría
Mario Pérez-Montoro
author_sort José María Díaz Nafría
collection DOAJ
description Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske’s approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.
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spelling doaj.art-713d4921e1ef41ab88a67a02bec58eed2023-09-02T07:49:47ZengPaderborn University: Media Systems and Media Organisation Research GrouptripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique1726-670X1726-670X2011-10-019235836610.31269/triplec.v9i2.285285Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s ApproachJosé María Díaz Nafría0Mario Pérez-Montoro1Science of Information Institute, Washington, U.S.A; Universidad de León, SpainDepartment of Information Science, University of Barcelona, SpainBased upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske’s approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/285Physics of observationWavesInverse problemTheory of perceptionBiophysicsDretskeEpistemologyCommunicationCognitionSignalInformation contentInformation flow
spellingShingle José María Díaz Nafría
Mario Pérez-Montoro
Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique
Physics of observation
Waves
Inverse problem
Theory of perception
Biophysics
Dretske
Epistemology
Communication
Cognition
Signal
Information content
Information flow
title Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
title_full Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
title_fullStr Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
title_full_unstemmed Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
title_short Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
title_sort is information a sufficient basis for cognition part 1 critique of dretske s approach
topic Physics of observation
Waves
Inverse problem
Theory of perception
Biophysics
Dretske
Epistemology
Communication
Cognition
Signal
Information content
Information flow
url https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/285
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