Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil
In his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he is a moral agent. I first argue...
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MDPI AG
2023-01-01
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/157 |
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author | Jonathan C. Rutledge |
author_facet | Jonathan C. Rutledge |
author_sort | Jonathan C. Rutledge |
collection | DOAJ |
description | In his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he is a moral agent. I first argue against this assumption by appealing to recent work by Mark Murphy before, secondly, suggesting an alternative way to frame Sterba’s argument in terms of divine love. One can distinguish God’s motivation to promote creaturely welfare on the basis of love from a motivation grounded in morality, and I claim that doing so results in a stronger form of the logical argument. |
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id | doaj.art-71ceff4a66f043958a757a5de6dea8a5 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2077-1444 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-11T08:13:50Z |
publishDate | 2023-01-01 |
publisher | MDPI AG |
record_format | Article |
series | Religions |
spelling | doaj.art-71ceff4a66f043958a757a5de6dea8a52023-11-16T22:58:55ZengMDPI AGReligions2077-14442023-01-0114215710.3390/rel14020157Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of EvilJonathan C. Rutledge0Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USAIn his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he is a moral agent. I first argue against this assumption by appealing to recent work by Mark Murphy before, secondly, suggesting an alternative way to frame Sterba’s argument in terms of divine love. One can distinguish God’s motivation to promote creaturely welfare on the basis of love from a motivation grounded in morality, and I claim that doing so results in a stronger form of the logical argument.https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/157problem of evilrationalityvalue theorydivine agency |
spellingShingle | Jonathan C. Rutledge Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil Religions problem of evil rationality value theory divine agency |
title | Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil |
title_full | Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil |
title_fullStr | Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil |
title_full_unstemmed | Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil |
title_short | Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil |
title_sort | divine morality or divine love on sterba s new logical problem of evil |
topic | problem of evil rationality value theory divine agency |
url | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/157 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT jonathancrutledge divinemoralityordivineloveonsterbasnewlogicalproblemofevil |