Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil

In his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he is a moral agent. I first argue...

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Main Author: Jonathan C. Rutledge
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2023-01-01
Series:Religions
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/157
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author Jonathan C. Rutledge
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description In his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he is a moral agent. I first argue against this assumption by appealing to recent work by Mark Murphy before, secondly, suggesting an alternative way to frame Sterba’s argument in terms of divine love. One can distinguish God’s motivation to promote creaturely welfare on the basis of love from a motivation grounded in morality, and I claim that doing so results in a stronger form of the logical argument.
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spelling doaj.art-71ceff4a66f043958a757a5de6dea8a52023-11-16T22:58:55ZengMDPI AGReligions2077-14442023-01-0114215710.3390/rel14020157Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of EvilJonathan C. Rutledge0Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USAIn his recent version of the logical problem of evil, James Sterba articulates several moral principles that, on the assumption that God is morally perfect, seem to entail God’s non-existence. Such moral principles, however, only apply to God on the assumption that he is a moral agent. I first argue against this assumption by appealing to recent work by Mark Murphy before, secondly, suggesting an alternative way to frame Sterba’s argument in terms of divine love. One can distinguish God’s motivation to promote creaturely welfare on the basis of love from a motivation grounded in morality, and I claim that doing so results in a stronger form of the logical argument.https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/157problem of evilrationalityvalue theorydivine agency
spellingShingle Jonathan C. Rutledge
Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil
Religions
problem of evil
rationality
value theory
divine agency
title Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil
title_full Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil
title_fullStr Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil
title_full_unstemmed Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil
title_short Divine Morality or Divine Love? On Sterba’s New Logical Problem of Evil
title_sort divine morality or divine love on sterba s new logical problem of evil
topic problem of evil
rationality
value theory
divine agency
url https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/2/157
work_keys_str_mv AT jonathancrutledge divinemoralityordivineloveonsterbasnewlogicalproblemofevil