Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza

Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza refuses to human mind and therefore to man the status of substance : man is defined as the union of two modes, body and mind. We can’t distinguish, as in Descartes, a substantial identity, conferred to the body by the mind, and a modal identity, determined by the relat...

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Main Author: Lamine Hamlaoui
Format: Article
Language:fra
Published: École Normale Supérieure de Lyon 2005-09-01
Series:Astérion
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/325
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author Lamine Hamlaoui
author_facet Lamine Hamlaoui
author_sort Lamine Hamlaoui
collection DOAJ
description Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza refuses to human mind and therefore to man the status of substance : man is defined as the union of two modes, body and mind. We can’t distinguish, as in Descartes, a substantial identity, conferred to the body by the mind, and a modal identity, determined by the relation between human body and other bodies. Both identities form an essential identity. This paper explains the problematical character of this identity in Spinoza’s Ethic. Human mind is indeed deduced and defined as the idea of human body, namely the concept of human body formed by God. But sometimes Spinoza identifies the idea of human body with the essence of human body, sometimes he makes a distinction between both. In the same way, sometimes he identifies the idea of human body with the idea of human mind, in accordance with parallelism of attributes, sometimes he distinguishes both. We can see, therefore, internal tensions in the system.
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spelling doaj.art-7214f43ff6744e31a86212f72880bd392022-12-22T00:57:33ZfraÉcole Normale Supérieure de LyonAstérion1762-61102005-09-01310.4000/asterion.325Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon SpinozaLamine HamlaouiContrary to Descartes, Spinoza refuses to human mind and therefore to man the status of substance : man is defined as the union of two modes, body and mind. We can’t distinguish, as in Descartes, a substantial identity, conferred to the body by the mind, and a modal identity, determined by the relation between human body and other bodies. Both identities form an essential identity. This paper explains the problematical character of this identity in Spinoza’s Ethic. Human mind is indeed deduced and defined as the idea of human body, namely the concept of human body formed by God. But sometimes Spinoza identifies the idea of human body with the essence of human body, sometimes he makes a distinction between both. In the same way, sometimes he identifies the idea of human body with the idea of human mind, in accordance with parallelism of attributes, sometimes he distinguishes both. We can see, therefore, internal tensions in the system.http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/325identitéesprit humaincorps humainessencesubstanceidée
spellingShingle Lamine Hamlaoui
Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza
Astérion
identité
esprit humain
corps humain
essence
substance
idée
title Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza
title_full Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza
title_fullStr Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza
title_full_unstemmed Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza
title_short Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza
title_sort corps et esprit l identite humaine selon spinoza
topic identité
esprit humain
corps humain
essence
substance
idée
url http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/325
work_keys_str_mv AT laminehamlaoui corpsetespritlidentitehumaineselonspinoza