Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza
Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza refuses to human mind and therefore to man the status of substance : man is defined as the union of two modes, body and mind. We can’t distinguish, as in Descartes, a substantial identity, conferred to the body by the mind, and a modal identity, determined by the relat...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | fra |
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École Normale Supérieure de Lyon
2005-09-01
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Series: | Astérion |
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Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/325 |
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author | Lamine Hamlaoui |
author_facet | Lamine Hamlaoui |
author_sort | Lamine Hamlaoui |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza refuses to human mind and therefore to man the status of substance : man is defined as the union of two modes, body and mind. We can’t distinguish, as in Descartes, a substantial identity, conferred to the body by the mind, and a modal identity, determined by the relation between human body and other bodies. Both identities form an essential identity. This paper explains the problematical character of this identity in Spinoza’s Ethic. Human mind is indeed deduced and defined as the idea of human body, namely the concept of human body formed by God. But sometimes Spinoza identifies the idea of human body with the essence of human body, sometimes he makes a distinction between both. In the same way, sometimes he identifies the idea of human body with the idea of human mind, in accordance with parallelism of attributes, sometimes he distinguishes both. We can see, therefore, internal tensions in the system. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-11T17:10:07Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-7214f43ff6744e31a86212f72880bd39 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1762-6110 |
language | fra |
last_indexed | 2024-12-11T17:10:07Z |
publishDate | 2005-09-01 |
publisher | École Normale Supérieure de Lyon |
record_format | Article |
series | Astérion |
spelling | doaj.art-7214f43ff6744e31a86212f72880bd392022-12-22T00:57:33ZfraÉcole Normale Supérieure de LyonAstérion1762-61102005-09-01310.4000/asterion.325Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon SpinozaLamine HamlaouiContrary to Descartes, Spinoza refuses to human mind and therefore to man the status of substance : man is defined as the union of two modes, body and mind. We can’t distinguish, as in Descartes, a substantial identity, conferred to the body by the mind, and a modal identity, determined by the relation between human body and other bodies. Both identities form an essential identity. This paper explains the problematical character of this identity in Spinoza’s Ethic. Human mind is indeed deduced and defined as the idea of human body, namely the concept of human body formed by God. But sometimes Spinoza identifies the idea of human body with the essence of human body, sometimes he makes a distinction between both. In the same way, sometimes he identifies the idea of human body with the idea of human mind, in accordance with parallelism of attributes, sometimes he distinguishes both. We can see, therefore, internal tensions in the system.http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/325identitéesprit humaincorps humainessencesubstanceidée |
spellingShingle | Lamine Hamlaoui Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza Astérion identité esprit humain corps humain essence substance idée |
title | Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza |
title_full | Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza |
title_fullStr | Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza |
title_full_unstemmed | Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza |
title_short | Corps et esprit : l’identité humaine selon Spinoza |
title_sort | corps et esprit l identite humaine selon spinoza |
topic | identité esprit humain corps humain essence substance idée |
url | http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/325 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT laminehamlaoui corpsetespritlidentitehumaineselonspinoza |