Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence

To what extent can democratic leaders mitigate the costs of reneging on alliance agreements? Previous research suggests that democratic leaders suffer from domestic backlash if they decide to renege on alliance treaties. However, less is known about whether and to what extent leaders can mitigate th...

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Main Authors: Weifang Xu, Kai Quek, Mark Souva
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2023-09-01
Series:Research & Politics
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231203808
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author Weifang Xu
Kai Quek
Mark Souva
author_facet Weifang Xu
Kai Quek
Mark Souva
author_sort Weifang Xu
collection DOAJ
description To what extent can democratic leaders mitigate the costs of reneging on alliance agreements? Previous research suggests that democratic leaders suffer from domestic backlash if they decide to renege on alliance treaties. However, less is known about whether and to what extent leaders can mitigate the domestic costs of reneging on alliance commitments. We study strategies leaders use to mitigate these costs. Specifically, we experimentally investigate whether and how much the costs of reneging are affected by different sidestepping strategies and the costs of fulfilling an alliance commitment. Results show that the potential costs of fulfilling commitments can dilute the domestic backlash for reneging on alliances, but various sidestepping strategies that work in the standard audience-cost context of reneging on a public threat do not work for reneging on a formal alliance. These findings expand our understanding of the reliability of democratic alliances and show that reneging costs are contingent on the context.
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spelling doaj.art-725af83df7754c989241f7a6e55d57a72023-09-25T17:03:29ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802023-09-011010.1177/20531680231203808Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidenceWeifang XuKai QuekMark SouvaTo what extent can democratic leaders mitigate the costs of reneging on alliance agreements? Previous research suggests that democratic leaders suffer from domestic backlash if they decide to renege on alliance treaties. However, less is known about whether and to what extent leaders can mitigate the domestic costs of reneging on alliance commitments. We study strategies leaders use to mitigate these costs. Specifically, we experimentally investigate whether and how much the costs of reneging are affected by different sidestepping strategies and the costs of fulfilling an alliance commitment. Results show that the potential costs of fulfilling commitments can dilute the domestic backlash for reneging on alliances, but various sidestepping strategies that work in the standard audience-cost context of reneging on a public threat do not work for reneging on a formal alliance. These findings expand our understanding of the reliability of democratic alliances and show that reneging costs are contingent on the context.https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231203808
spellingShingle Weifang Xu
Kai Quek
Mark Souva
Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence
Research & Politics
title Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence
title_full Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence
title_fullStr Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence
title_full_unstemmed Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence
title_short Reneging on alliances: Experimental evidence
title_sort reneging on alliances experimental evidence
url https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231203808
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AT kaiquek renegingonalliancesexperimentalevidence
AT marksouva renegingonalliancesexperimentalevidence