Reactive Strategies: An Inch of Memory, a Mile of Equilibria
We explore how an incremental change in complexity of strategies (“an inch of memory”) in repeated interactions influences the sets of Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy and payoff profiles. For this, we introduce the two most basic setups of repeated games, where players are allowed to use only reactiv...
Main Author: | Artem Baklanov |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2021-05-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/42 |
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