Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons
Group-based reasons are reasons to play one’s part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based rea...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Vienna
2017-02-01
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| Series: | Journal of Social Ontology |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0006 |
| _version_ | 1797715280669966336 |
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| author | Woodard Christopher |
| author_facet | Woodard Christopher |
| author_sort | Woodard Christopher |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Group-based reasons are reasons to play one’s part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based reasons in cases where the relevant group is not or would not be itself an agent. According to the behaviour-first conception, what matters is that the other members of the group would play their parts in the relevant pattern, not whether they would have the cooperative intentional states constitutive of group agency in doing so. This paper argues against these conceptions and in favour of the powers-first conception, according to which what matters is that the members of the group have practically relevant powers. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:04:57Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7294699496384e5aa5301677b1174fa3 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2196-9655 2196-9663 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:04:57Z |
| publishDate | 2017-02-01 |
| publisher | University of Vienna |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Social Ontology |
| spelling | doaj.art-7294699496384e5aa5301677b1174fa32023-09-02T19:39:06ZengUniversity of ViennaJournal of Social Ontology2196-96552196-96632017-02-013110712710.1515/jso-2016-0006jso-2016-0006Three Conceptions of Group-Based ReasonsWoodard Christopher0Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Humanities Building, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom, Phone: +44 (0) 115 951 5844Group-based reasons are reasons to play one’s part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based reasons in cases where the relevant group is not or would not be itself an agent. According to the behaviour-first conception, what matters is that the other members of the group would play their parts in the relevant pattern, not whether they would have the cooperative intentional states constitutive of group agency in doing so. This paper argues against these conceptions and in favour of the powers-first conception, according to which what matters is that the members of the group have practically relevant powers.https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0006reasonsgroupsobligationswillingnessresponsibility |
| spellingShingle | Woodard Christopher Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons Journal of Social Ontology reasons groups obligations willingness responsibility |
| title | Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons |
| title_full | Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons |
| title_fullStr | Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons |
| title_full_unstemmed | Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons |
| title_short | Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons |
| title_sort | three conceptions of group based reasons |
| topic | reasons groups obligations willingness responsibility |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0006 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT woodardchristopher threeconceptionsofgroupbasedreasons |