Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic Rationality
The aim of the article is to propose bounded epistemic rationality as a concept that blurs the divide between normative and descriptive approaches to the study of rationality. I illustrate the contrast between philosophy as a normative discipline and psychology as the empirical study of cognition an...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Croatian Interdisciplinary Society
2024-02-01
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| Series: | Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems |
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| Online Access: | https://indecs.eu/2024/indecs2024-pp107-121.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797268016123084800 |
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| author | Nastja Tomat |
| author_facet | Nastja Tomat |
| author_sort | Nastja Tomat |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The aim of the article is to propose bounded epistemic rationality as a concept that blurs the divide between normative and descriptive approaches to the study of rationality. I illustrate the contrast between philosophy as a normative discipline and psychology as the empirical study of cognition and show that unattainable standards and the arbitration problem pose a challenge for normative theories of rationality. I then outline three possible types of relations between normative and descriptive theories of rationality, the third being the proposal for hybrid concepts, such as bounded epistemic rationality, that include both normative and descriptive elements. I continue by describing Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded rationality and Gerd Gigerenzer’s ecological rationality, and consider the role of bounded rationality in epistemology. I reflect on the relationship between norms of epistemic and bounded rationality and finally, drawing on the work of David Thorstad, I suggest some features that I believe should be included in an account of bounded epistemic rationality. I aim to show that an understanding of epistemic rationality that is compatible with bounded rationality can help to avoid overly strict, idealized, as-if theories of rationality, narrow the gap between the normative and the descriptive, and bring us closer to a comprehensive understanding of epistemic rationality. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-25T01:25:46Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-72e50e5f7d824ec08145d157de959eea |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1334-4684 1334-4676 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-25T01:25:46Z |
| publishDate | 2024-02-01 |
| publisher | Croatian Interdisciplinary Society |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems |
| spelling | doaj.art-72e50e5f7d824ec08145d157de959eea2024-03-08T22:24:22ZengCroatian Interdisciplinary SocietyInterdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems1334-46841334-46762024-02-0122110712110.7906/indecs.22.1.6Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic RationalityNastja Tomat0University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, SloveniaThe aim of the article is to propose bounded epistemic rationality as a concept that blurs the divide between normative and descriptive approaches to the study of rationality. I illustrate the contrast between philosophy as a normative discipline and psychology as the empirical study of cognition and show that unattainable standards and the arbitration problem pose a challenge for normative theories of rationality. I then outline three possible types of relations between normative and descriptive theories of rationality, the third being the proposal for hybrid concepts, such as bounded epistemic rationality, that include both normative and descriptive elements. I continue by describing Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded rationality and Gerd Gigerenzer’s ecological rationality, and consider the role of bounded rationality in epistemology. I reflect on the relationship between norms of epistemic and bounded rationality and finally, drawing on the work of David Thorstad, I suggest some features that I believe should be included in an account of bounded epistemic rationality. I aim to show that an understanding of epistemic rationality that is compatible with bounded rationality can help to avoid overly strict, idealized, as-if theories of rationality, narrow the gap between the normative and the descriptive, and bring us closer to a comprehensive understanding of epistemic rationality.https://indecs.eu/2024/indecs2024-pp107-121.pdfepistemic rationalitybounded rationalityecological rationalitynormativedescriptive |
| spellingShingle | Nastja Tomat Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic Rationality Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems epistemic rationality bounded rationality ecological rationality normative descriptive |
| title | Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic Rationality |
| title_full | Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic Rationality |
| title_fullStr | Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic Rationality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic Rationality |
| title_short | Bridging the Gap between the Normative and the Descriptive: Bounded Epistemic Rationality |
| title_sort | bridging the gap between the normative and the descriptive bounded epistemic rationality |
| topic | epistemic rationality bounded rationality ecological rationality normative descriptive |
| url | https://indecs.eu/2024/indecs2024-pp107-121.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nastjatomat bridgingthegapbetweenthenormativeandthedescriptiveboundedepistemicrationality |