Feeder Cattle Price Slides

A theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estim...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: B. Wade Brorsen, Nouhoun Coulibaly, Francisca G.-C. Richter, DeeVon Bailey
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Western Agricultural Economics Association 2001-07-01
Series:Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31150
Description
Summary:A theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estimate of cattle weight. An empirical model using Superior Livestock Auction (SLA) data shows price slides used are smaller than those needed to cause the producer to give unbiased estimates of weight. Consistent with the model's predictions, producers slightly underestimate cattle weights.
ISSN:1068-5502
2327-8285