Feeder Cattle Price Slides

A theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estim...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: B. Wade Brorsen, Nouhoun Coulibaly, Francisca G.-C. Richter, DeeVon Bailey
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Western Agricultural Economics Association 2001-07-01
Series:Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31150
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author B. Wade Brorsen
Nouhoun Coulibaly
Francisca G.-C. Richter
DeeVon Bailey
author_facet B. Wade Brorsen
Nouhoun Coulibaly
Francisca G.-C. Richter
DeeVon Bailey
author_sort B. Wade Brorsen
collection DOAJ
description A theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estimate of cattle weight. An empirical model using Superior Livestock Auction (SLA) data shows price slides used are smaller than those needed to cause the producer to give unbiased estimates of weight. Consistent with the model's predictions, producers slightly underestimate cattle weights.
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spelling doaj.art-73d566a97c3b4ec8bcec6a9a9a7940982022-12-22T01:57:09ZengWestern Agricultural Economics AssociationJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics1068-55022327-82852001-07-0126129130810.22004/ag.econ.3115031150Feeder Cattle Price SlidesB. Wade BrorsenNouhoun CoulibalyFrancisca G.-C. RichterDeeVon BaileyA theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estimate of cattle weight. An empirical model using Superior Livestock Auction (SLA) data shows price slides used are smaller than those needed to cause the producer to give unbiased estimates of weight. Consistent with the model's predictions, producers slightly underestimate cattle weights.https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31150asymmetric informationfeeder cattlegame theoryprice slide
spellingShingle B. Wade Brorsen
Nouhoun Coulibaly
Francisca G.-C. Richter
DeeVon Bailey
Feeder Cattle Price Slides
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
asymmetric information
feeder cattle
game theory
price slide
title Feeder Cattle Price Slides
title_full Feeder Cattle Price Slides
title_fullStr Feeder Cattle Price Slides
title_full_unstemmed Feeder Cattle Price Slides
title_short Feeder Cattle Price Slides
title_sort feeder cattle price slides
topic asymmetric information
feeder cattle
game theory
price slide
url https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31150
work_keys_str_mv AT bwadebrorsen feedercattlepriceslides
AT nouhouncoulibaly feedercattlepriceslides
AT franciscagcrichter feedercattlepriceslides
AT deevonbailey feedercattlepriceslides