Feeder Cattle Price Slides
A theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estim...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Western Agricultural Economics Association
2001-07-01
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Series: | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31150 |
_version_ | 1818038737464983552 |
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author | B. Wade Brorsen Nouhoun Coulibaly Francisca G.-C. Richter DeeVon Bailey |
author_facet | B. Wade Brorsen Nouhoun Coulibaly Francisca G.-C. Richter DeeVon Bailey |
author_sort | B. Wade Brorsen |
collection | DOAJ |
description | A theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estimate of cattle weight. An empirical model using Superior Livestock Auction (SLA) data shows price slides used are smaller than those needed to cause the producer to give unbiased estimates of weight. Consistent with the model's predictions, producers slightly underestimate cattle weights. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-10T07:47:30Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-73d566a97c3b4ec8bcec6a9a9a794098 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1068-5502 2327-8285 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-10T07:47:30Z |
publishDate | 2001-07-01 |
publisher | Western Agricultural Economics Association |
record_format | Article |
series | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics |
spelling | doaj.art-73d566a97c3b4ec8bcec6a9a9a7940982022-12-22T01:57:09ZengWestern Agricultural Economics AssociationJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics1068-55022327-82852001-07-0126129130810.22004/ag.econ.3115031150Feeder Cattle Price SlidesB. Wade BrorsenNouhoun CoulibalyFrancisca G.-C. RichterDeeVon BaileyA theoretical model is developed to explain the economics of determining price slides for feeder cattle. The contract is viewed as a dynamic game with continuous strategies where the buyer and seller are the players. The model provides a solution for the price slide that guarantees an unbiased estimate of cattle weight. An empirical model using Superior Livestock Auction (SLA) data shows price slides used are smaller than those needed to cause the producer to give unbiased estimates of weight. Consistent with the model's predictions, producers slightly underestimate cattle weights.https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31150asymmetric informationfeeder cattlegame theoryprice slide |
spellingShingle | B. Wade Brorsen Nouhoun Coulibaly Francisca G.-C. Richter DeeVon Bailey Feeder Cattle Price Slides Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics asymmetric information feeder cattle game theory price slide |
title | Feeder Cattle Price Slides |
title_full | Feeder Cattle Price Slides |
title_fullStr | Feeder Cattle Price Slides |
title_full_unstemmed | Feeder Cattle Price Slides |
title_short | Feeder Cattle Price Slides |
title_sort | feeder cattle price slides |
topic | asymmetric information feeder cattle game theory price slide |
url | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31150 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT bwadebrorsen feedercattlepriceslides AT nouhouncoulibaly feedercattlepriceslides AT franciscagcrichter feedercattlepriceslides AT deevonbailey feedercattlepriceslides |