The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations
We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interactions, encoded as iterated games. We consider evolution within the space of memory-1strategies, and we characterize all evolutionary robust outcomes, as well as their tendency to evolve under the evolutio...
Main Authors: | Alexander J. Stewart, Joshua B. Plotkin |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2015-07-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/231 |
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