Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test

This paper discusses some difficulties in understanding the Turing test. It emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between conceptual and empirical perspectives and highlights the former as introducing more serious problems for the TT. Some objections against the Turingian framework stemming fr...

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Main Author: Ondřej Beran
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: University of Tartu 2014-04-01
Series:Studia Philosophica Estonica
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/view/173
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author Ondřej Beran
author_facet Ondřej Beran
author_sort Ondřej Beran
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description This paper discusses some difficulties in understanding the Turing test. It emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between conceptual and empirical perspectives and highlights the former as introducing more serious problems for the TT. Some objections against the Turingian framework stemming from the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy are exposed. The following serious problems are examined: 1) It considers a unique and exclusive criterion for thinking which amounts to their identification; 2) it misidentifies the relationship of speaking to thinking as that of a criterion; 3) it neglects the “natural” course of the development in semantics. However, these considerations suggest only that it is problematic to label a successful chatbot as a “thinking entity” without further qualifications, but not necessarily and once and for all incorrect. Philosophy has only little to say about the technical possibility of creating such an effective program.
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spelling doaj.art-74fb8a97e9dc40fb8fe93f93d1b7cf102022-12-22T01:31:16ZdeuUniversity of TartuStudia Philosophica Estonica1736-58992014-04-017.1355710.12697/spe.2014.7.1.02Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing TestOndřej Beran0Department of Philosophy, University of West BohemiaThis paper discusses some difficulties in understanding the Turing test. It emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between conceptual and empirical perspectives and highlights the former as introducing more serious problems for the TT. Some objections against the Turingian framework stemming from the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy are exposed. The following serious problems are examined: 1) It considers a unique and exclusive criterion for thinking which amounts to their identification; 2) it misidentifies the relationship of speaking to thinking as that of a criterion; 3) it neglects the “natural” course of the development in semantics. However, these considerations suggest only that it is problematic to label a successful chatbot as a “thinking entity” without further qualifications, but not necessarily and once and for all incorrect. Philosophy has only little to say about the technical possibility of creating such an effective program.http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/view/173Turing testartificial intelligence (AI)thinkingWittgenstein
spellingShingle Ondřej Beran
Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test
Studia Philosophica Estonica
Turing test
artificial intelligence (AI)
thinking
Wittgenstein
title Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test
title_full Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test
title_fullStr Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test
title_full_unstemmed Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test
title_short Wittgensteinian Perspectives on the Turing Test
title_sort wittgensteinian perspectives on the turing test
topic Turing test
artificial intelligence (AI)
thinking
Wittgenstein
url http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs/index.php/spe/article/view/173
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