Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic Consumers
Fresh agricultural products constantly lose freshness during sales, and strategic consumers choose the optimal purchase timing according to the freshness and prices. In this paper, we introduce freshness-keeping effort to describe the retailer’s freshness-keeping work and provide a consum...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2023-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10352166/ |
| _version_ | 1797376356162469888 |
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| author | Zhong Zhao Xinglei Chi |
| author_facet | Zhong Zhao Xinglei Chi |
| author_sort | Zhong Zhao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Fresh agricultural products constantly lose freshness during sales, and strategic consumers choose the optimal purchase timing according to the freshness and prices. In this paper, we introduce freshness-keeping effort to describe the retailer’s freshness-keeping work and provide a consumer utility function to describe strategic behavior. Additionally, we construct a dynamic decision-making model using the rational expectations equilibrium to improve the profits of each member. This study also designs a freshness-keeping cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we verified the effectiveness of the model by numerical simulation. The results show that optimal order quantity and freshness-keeping effort with strategic consumers are lower than without strategic consumers. Second, prices during normal and discount periods are both positively correlated with valuation. In addition, the normal price is negatively correlated with order quantity and freshness-keeping effort, and the discount price is positively correlated with order quantity. The correlation between discount price and freshness-keeping effort has a critical value, and the discount price is positively correlated with freshness-keeping effort when below the critical effort, and negatively after exceeding the critical effort. Third, the combination contract can increase expected profits for both supplier and retailer and help the decentralized supply chain achieve the expected profits of the centralized supply chain. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T19:37:22Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7501f1b72b1540bc807a54e95b6c969b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T19:37:22Z |
| publishDate | 2023-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-7501f1b72b1540bc807a54e95b6c969b2023-12-26T00:02:55ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362023-01-011114007714009110.1109/ACCESS.2023.334135910352166Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic ConsumersZhong Zhao0Xinglei Chi1https://orcid.org/0009-0004-5868-6022School of Economics and Management, Yantai University, Yantai, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Yantai University, Yantai, ChinaFresh agricultural products constantly lose freshness during sales, and strategic consumers choose the optimal purchase timing according to the freshness and prices. In this paper, we introduce freshness-keeping effort to describe the retailer’s freshness-keeping work and provide a consumer utility function to describe strategic behavior. Additionally, we construct a dynamic decision-making model using the rational expectations equilibrium to improve the profits of each member. This study also designs a freshness-keeping cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we verified the effectiveness of the model by numerical simulation. The results show that optimal order quantity and freshness-keeping effort with strategic consumers are lower than without strategic consumers. Second, prices during normal and discount periods are both positively correlated with valuation. In addition, the normal price is negatively correlated with order quantity and freshness-keeping effort, and the discount price is positively correlated with order quantity. The correlation between discount price and freshness-keeping effort has a critical value, and the discount price is positively correlated with freshness-keeping effort when below the critical effort, and negatively after exceeding the critical effort. Third, the combination contract can increase expected profits for both supplier and retailer and help the decentralized supply chain achieve the expected profits of the centralized supply chain.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10352166/Fresh agricultural productsfreshness-keeping effortstrategic consumersdynamic decision-makingrational expectations equilibriumsupply chain coordination |
| spellingShingle | Zhong Zhao Xinglei Chi Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic Consumers IEEE Access Fresh agricultural products freshness-keeping effort strategic consumers dynamic decision-making rational expectations equilibrium supply chain coordination |
| title | Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic Consumers |
| title_full | Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic Consumers |
| title_fullStr | Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic Consumers |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic Consumers |
| title_short | Dynamic Decision-Making in Fresh Products Supply Chain With Strategic Consumers |
| title_sort | dynamic decision making in fresh products supply chain with strategic consumers |
| topic | Fresh agricultural products freshness-keeping effort strategic consumers dynamic decision-making rational expectations equilibrium supply chain coordination |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10352166/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT zhongzhao dynamicdecisionmakinginfreshproductssupplychainwithstrategicconsumers AT xingleichi dynamicdecisionmakinginfreshproductssupplychainwithstrategicconsumers |