Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation

We show that the very characteristics of educational systems generate social segmentation. A stylised educational framework is constructed in which everyone receives a compulsory basic education and can subsequently choose between direct working, vocational studies and university. There is a selecti...

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Main Authors: Nathalie Chusseau, Joël Hellier
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Università Carlo Cattaneo LIUC 2011-12-01
Series:The European Journal of Comparative Economics
Subjects:
Online Access:http://eaces.liuc.it/18242979201102/182429792011080204.pdf
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author Nathalie Chusseau
Joël Hellier
author_facet Nathalie Chusseau
Joël Hellier
author_sort Nathalie Chusseau
collection DOAJ
description We show that the very characteristics of educational systems generate social segmentation. A stylised educational framework is constructed in which everyone receives a compulsory basic education and can subsequently choose between direct working, vocational studies and university. There is a selection for entering the university which consists of a minimum human capital level at the end of basic education. In the model, an individual's human capital depends (i) on her/his parents' human capital, (ii) on her/his schooling time, and (iii) on public expenditure for education. There are three education functions corresponding to each type of study (basic, vocational, university). Divergences in total educational expenditure, in its distribution between the three studies and in the selection severity, combined with the initial distribution of human capital across individuals, can result in very different social segmentations and generate under education traps (situations in which certain dynasties remain unskilled from generation to generation) at the steady state. We finally implement a series of simulations that illustrate these findings in the cases of egalitarian and elitist educational systems. Assuming the same initial distribution of human capital between individuals, we find that the first system results in two-segment stratification, quasi income equality and no under education trap whereas the elitist system generates three segments, significant inequality and a large under education trap
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spelling doaj.art-7507580743ce42efaba77fb5764189c52022-12-21T18:38:27ZengUniversità Carlo Cattaneo LIUCThe European Journal of Comparative Economics1824-29792011-12-0182203233Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social SegmentationNathalie ChusseauJoël HellierWe show that the very characteristics of educational systems generate social segmentation. A stylised educational framework is constructed in which everyone receives a compulsory basic education and can subsequently choose between direct working, vocational studies and university. There is a selection for entering the university which consists of a minimum human capital level at the end of basic education. In the model, an individual's human capital depends (i) on her/his parents' human capital, (ii) on her/his schooling time, and (iii) on public expenditure for education. There are three education functions corresponding to each type of study (basic, vocational, university). Divergences in total educational expenditure, in its distribution between the three studies and in the selection severity, combined with the initial distribution of human capital across individuals, can result in very different social segmentations and generate under education traps (situations in which certain dynasties remain unskilled from generation to generation) at the steady state. We finally implement a series of simulations that illustrate these findings in the cases of egalitarian and elitist educational systems. Assuming the same initial distribution of human capital between individuals, we find that the first system results in two-segment stratification, quasi income equality and no under education trap whereas the elitist system generates three segments, significant inequality and a large under education traphttp://eaces.liuc.it/18242979201102/182429792011080204.pdfEducational systemsintergenerational mobilitysocial segmentationunder-education trap
spellingShingle Nathalie Chusseau
Joël Hellier
Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation
The European Journal of Comparative Economics
Educational systems
intergenerational mobility
social segmentation
under-education trap
title Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation
title_full Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation
title_fullStr Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation
title_full_unstemmed Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation
title_short Educational Systems, Intergenerational Mobility and Social Segmentation
title_sort educational systems intergenerational mobility and social segmentation
topic Educational systems
intergenerational mobility
social segmentation
under-education trap
url http://eaces.liuc.it/18242979201102/182429792011080204.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT nathaliechusseau educationalsystemsintergenerationalmobilityandsocialsegmentation
AT joelhellier educationalsystemsintergenerationalmobilityandsocialsegmentation