Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World
Some philosophers hold that it would be impossible for us to do something actively if the physical world were causally closed, i.e., if in the physical world all events were caused by other physical events if they are caused at all. The reason for this view is that these philosophers adhere to what...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | ces |
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Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2019-02-01
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| Series: | Organon F |
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| Online Access: | https://www.organonf.com/journal/orgf-2019-26108/ |
| _version_ | 1818931241219522560 |
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| author | Ansgar Beckermann |
| author_facet | Ansgar Beckermann |
| author_sort | Ansgar Beckermann |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Some philosophers hold that it would be impossible for us to do something actively if the physical world were causally closed, i.e., if in the physical world all events were caused by other physical events if they are caused at all. The reason for this view is that these philosophers adhere to what I call the traditional picture of action. Recently, Martine Nida-Rümelin tried to defend this picture by phenomenological considerations. According to the traditional picture a behavior can only count as something an agent does actively if it is ultimately caused by the agent in an agent-causal way. In this paper I adduce three arguments against agent causation: (1) We do not really understand what agent causation is. (2) If agent causation were real, we would be confronted with the strange fact that human agents can only cause certain tiny events in the brain. (3) There is no empirical evidence that agent causation is real. In the last part of my paper I present an alternative account of the difference between what agents do actively and what is done to them. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-20T04:13:28Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-750b61189f8545f3b4d60852ec7e2392 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1335-0668 2585-7150 |
| language | ces |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-20T04:13:28Z |
| publishDate | 2019-02-01 |
| publisher | Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Organon F |
| spelling | doaj.art-750b61189f8545f3b4d60852ec7e23922022-12-21T19:53:50ZcesInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of SciencesOrganon F1335-06682585-71502019-02-0126112214010.31577/orgf.2019.26108Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical WorldAnsgar Beckermann010.31577/orgf.2019.26108Some philosophers hold that it would be impossible for us to do something actively if the physical world were causally closed, i.e., if in the physical world all events were caused by other physical events if they are caused at all. The reason for this view is that these philosophers adhere to what I call the traditional picture of action. Recently, Martine Nida-Rümelin tried to defend this picture by phenomenological considerations. According to the traditional picture a behavior can only count as something an agent does actively if it is ultimately caused by the agent in an agent-causal way. In this paper I adduce three arguments against agent causation: (1) We do not really understand what agent causation is. (2) If agent causation were real, we would be confronted with the strange fact that human agents can only cause certain tiny events in the brain. (3) There is no empirical evidence that agent causation is real. In the last part of my paper I present an alternative account of the difference between what agents do actively and what is done to them.https://www.organonf.com/journal/orgf-2019-26108/Active doingsagent causationcausal closure of the physical worldfree willMartine Nida-Rümelinsubject causation |
| spellingShingle | Ansgar Beckermann Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World Organon F Active doings agent causation causal closure of the physical world free will Martine Nida-Rümelin subject causation |
| title | Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World |
| title_full | Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World |
| title_fullStr | Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World |
| title_full_unstemmed | Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World |
| title_short | Active Doings and the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World |
| title_sort | active doings and the principle of the causal closure of the physical world |
| topic | Active doings agent causation causal closure of the physical world free will Martine Nida-Rümelin subject causation |
| url | https://www.organonf.com/journal/orgf-2019-26108/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ansgarbeckermann activedoingsandtheprincipleofthecausalclosureofthephysicalworld |